



New Horizons

Finding a path away from NATO's de-solidarisation

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Foreword


The *New Horizons* project involved the participation of more than three hundred individuals from across the transatlantic community and beyond. We have engaged policy planners at Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in NATO capitals, military officers in staff functions around the transatlantic area, NATO and EU officials in Brussels; representatives from the industry spread across Europe and North America, officials at international organisations from New York, The Hague, Cairo or Kabul, non-governmental organisations with a presence in Western capitals and those located in areas where Western forces deploy, think tanks and universities from the main policy centres, and students from both shores of the Atlantic. This was a truly global endeavour, made possible by the new technologies that reduce the burdens of distance. These internet-based tools allow for a wide range of opinions and views on the future of transatlantic security to be brought together with greater ease than before. We believe that by reaching out and engaging the wider community of security practitioners, experts and other stakeholders, we will improve on our collective ability to better understand the problems we face.

New Horizons would not have been possible without the willingness of those three hundred people to take time from their busy agendas to offer us their views on the strategic issues that confront us. We know who these people are, however we have also committed to their anonymity in order to facilitate an environment where ideas could be exchanged freely. We will also respect that anonymity now. However, we thank them for their participation and their trust in this project.

Furthermore, we wish to thank our partners in this effort. *New Horizons* has benefited from the exchange of ideas with colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, both located in Washington DC. In addition, we owe many thanks to the Security and Defence Agenda (SDA) in Brussels. With their support we were able to attract wider participation in a shorter amount of time than would otherwise have been possible. Also, *New Horizons* relied on the internet-based groupware suite provided by GroupSystems Inc. in Colorado (USA). It was the right tool for the job and made this online collaboration possible.

Finally, we owe a debt of gratitude to our colleagues at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and those that helped us keep the process on track. This includes Carel Hilderink, Frank van Kappen, Christa Meindersma, Stephan de Spiegeleire and René Willems. Special thanks also to Roderick Akkerman, Maarten Katsman and Niels Sprong for their unrelenting assistance.

Finally, we thank the Noaber Foundation for their generous support, making the *New Horizons* initiative possible in the first place.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized initial 'R' followed by a series of connected loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Rob de Wijk

Director

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

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NEW HORIZONS

Introduction

What do the practitioners of transatlantic security and the experts studying it as a profession think about the future of NATO?

This report is based on the findings of a broad-based consultation held among three hundred representatives of the key stakeholder groups of the Transatlantic Alliance. We invited the participation of national policymakers, experts at think tanks, military officers, NATO officials, EU officials, NGO representatives, officials at international organisations and university students. This was not a survey nor an opinion poll, but rather an internet-based collaborative effort to collect the views on, and discuss the most important strategic issues facing the future of NATO. The key findings of New Horizons can be found at the end of the report.

More than two-thirds of the NATO participants, seventy percent of think tank experts, three out of four national policy planners, and four out of five participating military officers believed there was a need for the Alliance to reassess its strategic purpose and foundation. Three out of four participants in the project believed there was a necessity to develop a new strategic document.

This broad support for a new strategic document can be attributed to the speed of the changes and challenges within the international security environment, as well as to the difficulty the Alliance experienced while trying to adjust. At the level of the international system, over the past two decades we have moved from the last throes of the bipolar Cold War, into a unipolar moment of Western predominance and US hegemony. The 9/11 attacks showed that American supremacy would not go unchallenged, and we saw the first tell-tale signs of a new tectonic shift towards a

multipolar global system. Recently, the National Intelligence Council came to a similar conclusion.¹ In international relations, a movement through three major systems in less than two decades, corresponding to different global divisions of power, is very fast. Not surprisingly, this movement included several major upheavals. This will persist, given the inherent instability that accompanies a multipolar system. What increased the tempo even further is the impact of the financial crisis and the global economic recession on international security. It has caught many people by surprise. Its ramifications for the security environment are not easy to predict. In fact, while catastrophic terrorism ranked highest on the security agenda until recently, a major source of concern is now the global economic downturn.² Together, the financial crisis and the effects of shifting to a multipolar system fuel a sense of profound uncertainty over the future of international security.

For NATO, the sheer speed of change, coupled with the appearance of new threats and new actors, underlines that the time is indeed ripe for a reassessment of one of its most central documents, the Strategic Concept. NATO's current Strategic Concept dates from 1999 and was drafted under a different international security constellation. In 1999, the United States was without doubt the dominant global power, the United Nations was embroiled with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Afghanistan was a distant and unknown country ruled by an even more distant and unknown group, Russia was slowly adopting a pro-Western stance, climate change may have been a truth but not an inconvenient one yet, and catastrophic terrorism still remained two years over the horizon. For the Alliance, the primary security challenge lay outside NATO territory, albeit in its immediate neighbourhood, namely the Balkans. In order to address this challenge, the Alliance in 1999 adopted a policy of 'out-of-area' operations, and slowly member states started transforming their military forces into 'expeditionary' forces.

Ten years later, the 'out-of-area' operations in the immediate neighbourhood of the Alliance have been supplanted by operations on a global scale. With three ongoing operations that can rightly be called global 'out-of-area' (ISAF in Afghanistan, the counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Iraq training mission), NATO seems to have internalised that central premise of the 1999 Strategic Concept. However, the security environment changed profoundly from that year onwards. The attacks of 9/11, the operational challenges in Afghanistan, the impact of Hurricane Katrina, the

1) National Intelligence Council (U.S.), *Global trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, November 2008).

2) Dennis C. Blair, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence* (Washington D.C.: Senate (U.S.), February 12, 2009).

dependency on natural resources and the political intimidation by quasi-democratic states showed that the traditional interpretation of collective defence has become insufficient. NATO has to interact with an increasing number of partners in military and other operations, in an effort to develop a comprehensive approach to complex emergencies. The relations with the European Union are strained, with the United Nations they are sub-optimal, and they are often non-existent with non-governmental organisations in theatre. Furthermore, more challenges are lurking over the horizon, not in the least precipitated by the as yet insufficiently understood ramifications of the global economic crisis. To cope with these challenges, the Alliance must strengthen its core, build robust partnerships and develop the internal flexibility to cope with the diverse range of challenges whenever and wherever they occur. The Alliance must shift from a mindset of collective defence to one of collective security, where military deterrence goes hand in hand with comprehensive crisis management capabilities and the resilience of society as a whole.

However, this will be difficult, since the Alliance faces a range of internal challenges standing in the way of this reinvention. Although NATO survived the period of internal friction and estrangement resulting from the Iraq War, the crisis revealed sore points among its members and consensus on addressing future issues is anything but guaranteed. The shared presumption of solidarity in the Alliance – the beating heart of the organisation – remains under stress. Now that NATO has celebrated its 60th birthday, de-solidarisation, a process best described as the weakening of solidarity within the Alliance, is more present than ever before.

De-solidarisation is the product of several strategic dilemmas. It is essential to identify these. But rather than turning exclusively to outside experts, this report draws on the opinions and views of the practitioners of transatlantic security. This report is based on consultations held among key communities in an attempt to unearth the predominant security issues facing the Alliance and to assess how to deal with them. The more than three hundred individuals participating in the consultation were drawn from nine different communities that all have a stake in the direction in which the Alliance will develop. These are seven professional communities consisting of:

- o NATO officials;
- o National policy-makers at Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence;
- o Staff officers with national armed forces;
- o Officials at the European Union;

- o Representatives from both defence and non-defence industry;
- o Officials at international organisations;
- o Non-governmental organisations.

The other two communities are experts from universities and think tanks from across Europe and North America, as well as students in International Relations at US and European universities.

The results of the research show that the principle of solidarity in the Alliance is being challenged along several dimensions. Centrifugal forces are pulling at the Alliance from within, while the changing security environment challenges the Alliance's coherence from the outside. Discord over ongoing operations, enlargement and membership, or the prioritisation of threats by allies create fissures. If left unattended, these will strategically weaken the Alliance in a period of geopolitical upheaval.

Drawing from the consultations, we have identified the key security issues facing the Alliance. We have structured these along three categories: global dynamics, security trends and challenges within the Alliance. The main issues or issue groups are discussed in separate chapters. The beginning of a number of chapters also contains a radar chart indicating the significance of a topic in the discussions of a community, or the relations of a topic with other challenges. Each chapter leads up to the formulation of a strategic dilemma for the Alliance. The eight strategic dilemmas that have been identified address the following topics:

- o Global Trends
 - ◇ The Financial Crisis and its Effects on Geopolitics
 - ◇ Resource and Energy Scarcity
- o Security Trends
 - ◇ Proliferation
 - ◇ Key security trends including state failure, non-state actors and terrorism, demographics, and societal vulnerabilities
- o Challenges within the Alliance
 - ◇ Afghanistan
 - ◇ Enlargement
 - ◇ Strategic Orientation of the Alliance
 - ◇ Russia

These issues amount to a series of concerns that, if mismanaged, may become tripwires for a reinvigorated Alliance. The dilemmas all concern the strategic orientation of the Alliance, and we believe that in this form de-solidarisation presents the single largest challenge to the future of NATO. A new Strategic Concept must find a way to deal with them.

Change must come. Not because it is easy, but because it is needed. Now is the time to reconsider the place of the Alliance in a rapidly changing security environment. The present times are indeed times of great challenge, but also times of great opportunity.

A Word On Methodology

Over the past two years several reports have addressed the future of NATO, either dealing exclusively with NATO itself or with the position of the organisation in the broader international security context.³ These reports have contributed to an ongoing discussion in policy circles about the future of the transatlantic security relationship, affirming that there is a need for new thinking. The reports offer very useful views and ideas on how to push the Alliance forward, but they lack an important element the *New Horizons* project hopes to provide. Rather than being the result of a series of expert sessions, this report is based on the views and opinions of the people who constitute the transatlantic security community. From October 2008 to February 2009, three hundred participants from across North America and Europe participated in a series of online brainstorm sessions and surveys, dealing with questions about the future of the security environment and NATO's role in it.

The consultations revolved around three main questions:

- o What are the main security issues facing the broader transatlantic community in the coming five to ten years?
- o What are possible solutions to these security issues?
- o What do these solutions imply for the role played by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation?

3) For instance, K. Naumann et al., *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership* (Lunteren: Noaber Foundation, 2007); D. Hamilton et al., *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21 st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Washington Project, February 2009); and F. Larrabee and J. Lindley-French, *Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for Action* (Gütersloh: Venusberg Group and Rand Corporation, 2009).

The questions focused on the period immediately beyond the short term, so five to ten years ahead. This way we hoped participants would not be exclusively led by presentism in their responses. In addition, the responses provided were anonymous, in order to stimulate an open discussion. This also minimised the risk of national or bureaucratic biases, creating an environment for an open exchange of views and ensuring increased participation from the circle of security practitioners.

Input on these three questions was drawn from three tiers.

- o An anonymous online collaborative brainstorm, segmented per community, in which the participants identified the main security issues for the coming five to ten years. In this brainstorm the participants were able to respond to and comment on each other's remarks.⁴
- o An online survey including:
 - ◇ Open-ended questions, asking the participants to identify their top five security issues and to elaborate on solutions as well as on the implications for NATO.
 - ◇ Multiple choice and closed questions. These provided quantitative data to support the various elements of the open-ended questions, covering areas such as the identification of the regions of concern to the Alliance or questions regarding the introduction of a new strategic document.
- o Background interviews and conference participation. *New Horizons team* members participated in a series of conferences held in the autumn of 2008 in Washington DC as part of the "Washington Project on NATO" in order to substantiate their views.

Our objective was not to offer a statistically validated opinion poll, but rather to capture the debate on the future of transatlantic security from amidst the broader transatlantic community. The opinions and views of the participants helped to identify the key challenges facing the Alliance, these are presented here alongside supporting quotes from the respondents. In this manner, our report aims to reflect the main elements of the debate on the future of NATO. While more than three hundred people do not constitute the entire transatlantic community, we have tried to include as many as possible from the most important interested parties to get the tone right.

4) The internet-based system used for the online collaborative phase was ThinkTank™ by GroupSystems Corp. www.groupsystems.com.

PARTICIPATION

The following maps illustrate the scope of participation in *New Horizons*. Figure 1 shows the geographic spread across all three hundred participants. From China to Canada, from Egypt to England, from Afghanistan to Austria, *New Horizons* included participants from all corners of the transatlantic region and beyond.

As can be taken from the maps, participation among all communities was evenly spread across the transatlantic community. With specific communities some differences did occur, but on the whole we believe we succeeded in achieving wide participation from across the range of communities.

As Figure 1 makes clear, participants were drawn equally from across Europe and North America, as well as from interested countries, including Russia, China and Ukraine.

The community of national policy-planners reflected the diversity in the Alliance (see Figure 2 - next page). Among the initial founders of the organisation, the United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium were represented. Mediterranean states were represented by Italy, Spain and Portugal, whereas the Scandinavian perspective vision was expressed by Norway. A significant proportion of Central and




Figure 1

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

NATIONAL POLICY PLANNERS





Figure 2

Eastern European policy planners were involved. Among them was a sizeable Polish, Baltic, Slovenian, Hungarian and Romanian representation. Finally, several non-NATO policy-makers participated, e.g. from Austria, Ukraine and Afghanistan. The level of participation ranged from ambassador to senior policy planner and below.

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

NATIONAL MILITARY





Figure 3

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

THINK-TANK




Figure 4

The staff officers from national armed forces, including generals, colonels, lieutenant-colonels and equivalents, mostly came from European countries (see Figure 3). They included the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Greece and Belgium, as well as Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Baltics, Poland, Czech Republic and Romania. North America was represented through Canadian participation.

The community of think tanks and universities consisted of individuals having a functional or geographic research interest in security policy (see Figure 4). From the point of view of geography this was the most diverse group – from Alaska to Siberia – including participants from North America, Northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, Scandinavia, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Turkey and Russia.

In addition, the wider range of international security challenges as well as the greater number of partner organisations cooperating with NATO member states, increase the benefit of inviting participants beyond these four groups. Therefore we invited participation from the European Union and the United Nations, as well as from the industry and non-governmental organisations. The latter group is formed by humanitarian organisations cooperating in-theatre with NATO forces, human rights organisations, and environmental NGOs. Participants from the industrial community were defence and non-defence corporations with an international outlook, having a stake in the development of transatlantic relations (see Figure 5).

FUNCTIONAL SPREAD OF INDUSTRY





Figure 5

Finally, since the report addresses the future of the Alliance, the coming generation of policy planners and officials was also involved. We invited the participation of International Relations students on both sides of the Atlantic, from Leiden University and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna and Washington DC.

The participants in *New Horizons* truly spanned the transatlantic community and beyond in an effort to get as broad an input as possible regarding the future of the Alliance and the challenges it confronts.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

NEW HORIZONS COMMUNITY



Which Future Challenges?

More than eighteen hundred answers were given by the participants. The deconstruction of their responses allows us to give a broad analysis of the main concepts that were identified. The chart on the previous page depicts the division of future challenges identified by all participants. While the chart enables us to identify specific challenges, many of these challenges are interrelated and therefore cannot be considered in isolation. This is the case with so-called composite threats, a series of interrelated asymmetric challenges that can threaten Western societies independently or collectively. It means that the different categories of challenges need to be viewed as a collective. One think tank expert summarised this as follows:



The most dangerous threat for the future will be both hybrid and composed. Hybrid, because states and non-state actors will cooperate in a joint effort. Composed, because the threat will consist of different elements (financial, economic, military, terrorism, cyber, blackmail with access to scarce resources, etc.) that will reinforce each other.



Although it has been addressed by previous think tank reports and opinion polls,⁵ the results from *New Horizons* show interesting nuances among different policy organisations and communities. Several observations can be made when looking at the results among the communities.⁶

5) See for instance the Transatlantic Trends research by the German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo at <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/>.

6) The figures presenting the spread of security issues per community can be found in the Annex.

- o Among international organisations and the European Union the concern over financial-economic trends figured prominently. NATO officials and military staffs, on the other hand, hardly mentioned these at all.
- o Likewise, respondents in the community of non-governmental organisations specifically emphasised the challenge of resource and energy scarcity (more than two in five responses referred to it). It also figured strongly among the responses of NATO officials.
- o Representatives from the industry focused on the impact of advances in technology, perhaps not surprisingly, since several high-tech and information technology corporations were involved in the consultation.
- o The shift in the global balance of power was particularly emphasised by military officers, think tank experts, national policy planners and European Union officials. For example, one European Union official summarised the challenges linked to the global shift in power as follows:



How to bring China and Russia into a controlled dynamic of power? How to align EU political power with its economic significance? And how to develop a mechanism to manage the balance of economic power?



- o Challenges within the Transatlantic Alliance received significant attention among NGOs, students, think tank experts and NATO officials. Interestingly, however, among national policy planners hardly any concern over this was expressed.
- o Concern over proliferation was widely mentioned, particularly by military officers, students, national policy planners, NATO officials and representatives from the industry. Among national policy planners, proliferation was identified as the primary security challenge. It appeared as both the first and second most important security challenge in this community.
- o The role of non-state actors was emphasised by think tank experts, military officers, NATO officials and representatives from the industry.
- o Concerns over both climate change and demographic trends were mentioned frequently by think tank experts and NATO officials, and hardly by national policy planners.

Looking at the traditional NATO communities of NATO officials, national policy planners and military staffs we can say that:

- o NATO officials showed more focus on resource and energy scarcity than military officers and policy planners. This may be explained by concern over the security relationship with Russia and the concurrent ongoing anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. These operations have a strong energy-security dimension. A NATO official alluded to the emphasis on the resource dynamic:



The control of energy resources by a limited number of producers will place Alliance countries in a precarious position. ... This will give undue influence to nations such as Russia within Alliance policy-making...




- o Similarly, challenges within the Transatlantic Alliance were singled out repeatedly by NATO officials, and less so by military staffs. Policy planners hardly mentioned them at all. Half the time NATO officials referred to this challenge as the *“most important security challenge”*. A possible explanation for this difference is that NATO officials deal with problems relating to solidarity, burden-sharing and cooperation with the European Union on a day-to-day basis, whereas policy planners do not.
- o National policy planners and military staffs emphasised the global shift in power, NATO officials hardly at all.
- o Climate change figured strongly among NATO officials, and hardly with the other two communities.
- o Military staffs focused more on changes in warfare than the other two communities, possibly as a result of their operational outlook.
- o However, military staffs had little attention for state failure, as opposed to NATO officials and policy planners.
- o There was a more or less even spread regarding non-state actors, military-operational challenges, demographics, terrorism and advances in technology.

Throughout the consultations, respondents identified a series of key security issues. While it is not possible to repeat all their answers below, the range of the debate is presented using their input. From these challenges several key strategic dilemmas follow, that must be addressed to move the Alliance on a course away from de-solidarisation.


GLOBAL DYNAMICS

SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

SHIFT IN GLOBAL BALANCE



INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE



The Global Shift in Power and the Rise of a Multipolar System



I believe we will witness an increasingly tough competition about who sets the rules of politics in the 21st century and what should be the founding principles for the rules of international politics. The OECD world, which had more or less a monopoly in this game in the past, will be challenged in particular by authoritarian regimes that have enough economic, financial and thus also political power to go their own way.



- Participant from think tank community of experts

From the consultations three global trends can be identified that together shape the overarching dynamic in the international security environment. They are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. These trends are the global shift in power towards a multipolar system, the global economic crisis and resource and energy scarcity. Together they form the main determinant factors of the international security dynamic.

The global shift in power is the key global trend shaping future security affairs. Precipitated by the relative decline of US power, and the simultaneous rise of China and India, it has similarly become apparent by the more dominant role claimed by others in global affairs, such as Russia and Iran. The global shift implies a move away from an international system dominated by the United States and towards one containing several centres of gravity.

This development was echoed in reports such as the National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2025":

“

A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of non-state actors – businesses, tribes, religious organisations, and even criminal networks – also will increase.⁷

”

According to the National Intelligence Council this shift will result in a breakdown of the common concept of 'the international community'. The bonds between different states will weaken as alternative visions, somewhat akin to political blocs, emerge. Among the respondents this view was also expressed. One think tank expert captured the argument as follows:

“

[There is a] need to adapt from the past half century of American hegemony to a more diffuse system of BRIC stakeholders in shifting coalitions.

”

Diffuse distribution of power is a central characteristic of a multipolar system and increases the likelihood of shifting coalitions and instability in international politics. . Among policy planners the shift in global balance was identified as follows:

“

[The key challenge is the] power diffusion within and among nation-states, such as the rise of China and India and the importance of energy states and regions.

”

The changing nature of the international security dynamic is driven by changes in the economic realm, specifically in the field of energy policy. The global shift in power is accelerated by the ongoing economic redistribution from oil-consuming to oil-producing states. This process is likely to continue, because at present nearly four-fifths of the known oil reserves are controlled by national oil companies such as Saudi Aramco, Malaysia's Petronas, Brazil's Petrobras, Russia's GazProm and the National Iranian Oil Company. This essentially means that revenues flow directly to the state, and rising oil prices directly benefit the government, rather than a private corporation.

At the same time, high oil and natural gas prices prompted a number of states to

7) National Intelligence Council (U.S.), *Global trends 2025: A Transformed World*, p. iv.

challenge American financial primacy, also as a result of a weakening dollar. In 2006, for instance, Russian President Putin announced a plan to sell oil futures in rubles on the Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange in a move signaling a challenge to the dollar-dominance of oil sales. The position of the US dollar as a reserve currency has come under stress, even before the global economic crisis. As an example, in the period between 2001 and 2004, OPEC members reduced their holdings of US dollars from 75% to 61.5%. The global economic crisis is likely to further weaken the position of the dollar.

It is not only the financial basis of Western dominance that has come under stress. If we look at the economy, the dependency on natural resources is likely to increase further, giving significant leverage to resource-exporting states. Also, on the political and military stage new powers are emerging. This has created composite threats, where states are able to challenge Western countries along different dimensions. One example is Russia's attempt to influence politics in Kyrgyzstan by extending credit-lines to Parliament in the midst of a global economic downturn, the use of pipeline politics to interfere in Ukrainian politics, the struggle over the missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic. It also includes Russia's threat to position Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, and the willingness to use military force in its former Soviet backyard as illustrated by the military campaign in Georgia in August 2008. Russia may choose from various ways to influence others, including European states. Among the participants, the trend of Russian financial, economic, political and military agitation as a function of the global shift of power has led to some anxiety. A NATO official warned for:



[A] return of tensions between the West and Russia, caused by the combination of a possible return of opposing political ideologies, energy security and competition for other industrial resources, and competition for power.



This topic will also be addressed below.

Still, the global shift is not only the result of new rising states. Non-state actors increasingly impact the strategic environment. The attention given to Al Qaeda and its affiliates over the past years, and the level to which Western forces are embattled in insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan show that international politics are no longer the prerogative of national governments.

RELEVANT QUOTES

GLOBAL SHIFT IN POWER

National Military

Ongoing differences between regional powers over regional and/or global dominance (India, China, Russia, USA). The differences are, if they remain unsolved, likely to erupt in regionally limited clashes of violent conflict.

NATO

Return of tensions between the West and Russia, caused by a combination of a possible return of opposing political ideologies, energy security and competition for other industrial resources, competition for power.

National Policy Planners

The growing importance of emerging economies such as China, India, Brasil, etc. This issue relates to a general principle whether the role of these countries in international decision-making will grow. This touches upon other areas, not only security, including economy.

International Organisations & EU

The need for better alignment between on the one hand economic power and, on the other hand, political responsibility for the use of power in the world. It is in this context that three subordinate issues arise: how to bring China and Russia into a controlled dynamic of power. How to align EU political power with its economic significance and how to develop a mechanism to manage the balance of economic power. The traditional international financial institutions are politically outflanked by the G7 and G20 to have any significant clout over member states' economic and financial policies.

Students

The rise of China and India as military superpower, coupled with the loss of American hegemony.

Think Tanks

'Friction' connected with the transformation of the international system towards a one with multiple centres of power – struggle for influence, peripheral conflicts, further weakening of the institutions such as the UN, OSCE, to be expected.

IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL SHIFT

The rise of multiple nodes of power, whether they are states or non-states, has been referred to in academic and policy circles as non-polarity.⁸ The advent of non-polarity in the current age has several consequences for the international security environment.

States with alternative political systems gain more power and place greater demands on international institutions and regimes. Many of these regimes will lose their legitimacy and credibility.

A national military officer said that the *"emerging new powers in the next 10 years will demand more in [the] international arena"* and concluded that rather than counterbalancing Western power, these powers would push for changes in the institutional framework.

A think tank expert was gloomier, when he described wholesale institutional failure as a result of the crisis:



Due to the power shift in the world international organisations, international law and regimes will become less effective. The West will have more difficulties 'shaping' the world.



Military staff officers felt that the United Nations should adapt to the changing geostrategic environment in order to remain *"relevant and legitimate"*. The UN was *"no longer seen as independent and legitimate"*.

A further consequence is that weakened international institutions lead to a reduced capability to solve regional crises.

8) Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 44-56.

A think tank expert noted that:

“

Due to multipolarity the arc of crisis will remain and is likely to become more unstable. The reason for this is that because of competing interests among the major players, conflict resolution will be more difficult. The number of failed states and black holes will increase.

”

Also, one expert in the think tank community emphasised that the major concern is the shift itself and that the process of change leads to instability:

“

[A central challenge is] ‘friction’ connected with the transformation of the international system towards one with multiple centres of power.

”

Further trends promoting such friction are related to demographics and poverty. They increase frustrations among and within societies. As a think tank expert mentioned:

“

Population stress arising from differences in population growth rates between rich and poor societies, illegal immigration, migration that dilutes societal identity, and from spiralling growth of megacities in poor countries.

”

As an ulterior element in the global shift of power, participants recognised the impact of global inequality. An expert in the think tank community noted:

“

As no. 1 challenge I see the growing gap between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in terms of economic prosperity as well as political freedom, which may result in very disruptive outbreaks, firstly within countries – but Europe will face the indirect negative fall-out.

”

Finally, as will be elaborated below, the global shift in power is likely to be accelerated by the current economic crisis and will lead to increased security issues over resource and energy scarcity, as resource dependencies increase.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

There appeared consensus among the respondents that a new constellation of global power implied a need for NATO to define a new role for itself. Such a role would be based on the Alliance integrating and operating more closely with other international partners.

A senior think tank expert identified the need for a comprehensive overhaul of interagency cooperation.⁹ Likewise, the official argued that the rise of composite threats – which are no longer purely military – signal an overall relative decline in the stature of the Alliance:



NATO must focus more on interacting with other organisations, in order to function as part of a complex holistic machinery. As a military alliance, NATO as such is less well equipped to deal with these issues. Its political relevance will probably diminish.



However, it was accepted that such change will not be easy. Paraphrasing an expert in the think tank community, the shift in global power will prove troublesome for European states, given the lack of coordination inside the European Union, vis-à-vis the rising powers:



The US is likely to retain strength, since it can enter into bilateral agreements with China and India that would be to their mutual advantage. EU needs to be more internally coordinated to be able to present a strong balance as a collective organisation.



One expert in the think tank community further suggested that if the new group of global powers could negotiate a new global governance structure, NATO could be used as an instrument for crisis prevention and post-crisis stabilisation and retain a central position in the global security architecture. Similarly, that position could be combined with a closer relationship with the United Nations. A think tank expert mentioned that:

9) Elements of the lack of interagency coordination were also addressed in Naumann et al., *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, pp. 115-143.



NATO would have to place its operations firmly within a larger integrated approach of problems, legitimised by a global governance structure, presumably the UNSC. It should not lend itself to unilateral (US-led) wars on global terror or on drugs, etc. that harm the West's credibility against its own standards.



Many of these implications rely on a new contract for the international system, a 'Bretton Woods'-like agreement perhaps. This still stands to be seen. In any case, the specific steps needed to arrive there were left unexplored by the respondents.

NATO could also cooperate more closely with other organisations, particularly those that reflect the rise of the 'East'. For instance, relations between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could be increased. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation includes one of the world's main energy producers, Russia, several republics in Central Asia including Kazakhstan, that hold substantial energy reserves, exploration opportunities or transit routes from the Caspian Basin to Asian markets, and one of the world's most important energy consumers and rising powers, China. Also, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has extended observer status to India, Iran and Pakistan. This entente, which started in 2001 as an energy dialogue, has developed a military security component as well and it is the one organisation that in itself reflects the rise of Asian powers. Other organizations that stand to gain increased influence are the G20 and the APEC forum.

As a bottom line, the West needs to reconsider its strategic orientation in the face of this global shift. However, answers have not been forthcoming. As one expert in the think tank community noted:




The Transatlantic Community has spent too little time thinking strategically about the rise of Asia and what it means for NATO.



SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

FINANCIAL-
ECONOMIC
TRENDS



The Financial Crisis and its Effect on Geopolitics



The primary near-term security concern ... is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.



-Dennis Blair, US Director of National Intelligence, 12 February 2009

Not Al Qaeda, not Afghanistan, nor Pakistan or the threat of Russia, but the global economic crisis is the major security concern, said the chief of the American intelligence agencies in early 2009.

The impact of the financial crisis and the global economic downturn dominates current security discussions. It is a further element in the main dynamic driving the security environment. A gloomy assessment pervaded the participants of *New Horizons* when considering its implications for the Alliance. This was echoed in the think tank community, where one respondent said:



The financial crisis will accelerate the shift to a multipolar world. Through sovereign wealth funds non-Western states get more political influence in Western states. Emerging powers will get more influence in international organisations traditionally dominated by the West (see the G20 Declaration). This will weaken the West's ability to defend its vital interests.



A European Union official argued, with some notable frustration, that the international financial institutions were bankrupt and that a new institutional framework was necessary:



The traditional international financial institutions are politically outflanked by the G7 and G20 to have any significant clout over member states' economic and financial policies. We may need to think of (a) a set of global 'Maastricht' financial stability criteria (limits on budget deficit, current account deficit, public borrowing, inflation) and (b) of a more powerful agency than the current International Financial Institutions to enforce these criteria. The fact that a country with 20% of world GDP has been permitted to run double deficits in the order of 5% of GDP for a number of years has wreaked serious havoc, and the world pays part of the bill.



A NATO official believed the financial crisis would increase global instability and offered the following argumentation regarding the impact of the financial crisis:



Continued impact of globalisation – both the continued globalisation of economic and security issues or, conversely, the reversal of globalisation brought about by severe economic recession will have consequences for the security policies of the Alliance. Failed states will proliferate and if member nations choose to withdraw into 'fortress NATO/EU', unresolved issues will continue to percolate and boil over drawing the Alliance into a more severe security crisis at a later date. 'Pay now or pay more later'.



GLOBAL IMPACT

Countries exporting oil and natural gas enjoyed substantial economic windfalls over the past years. Their foreign currency reserves increased as a result of high oil prices. However, some are in dire straits due to the global decrease in oil consumption and

the corresponding decrease in price.¹⁰ As will be detailed below, a new period of high oil prices is expected and will lead to competition over scarce reserves.

Still, even in a time of low oil prices tensions between oil-producing and oil-consuming states may mount, for instance when the producing countries, hungry for payments, increase pressure on buyers to honour their contracts, whereas at the same time the energy-consuming countries find it difficult to find the capital.¹¹

Asian manufacturing economies, and especially China, have a substantial buffer in place to cope with a global credit drought. Although the demand for their goods is decreasing, they are less vulnerable than the oil-producing states. Also, the Chinese economy is able to use its reserves to stimulate domestic demand.

A secondary effect is that capital has fled to safer havens, including Western states, and conversely, developing countries or weak economies have become vulnerable and may be strapped for cash. This has led countries like Iceland to file for bankruptcy and Eastern European countries to apply for large IMF bailouts. Often, this is accompanied by domestic disturbances and riots, as prices and unemployment rise. In developing regions like Africa, these economic worries are likely to fuel internal instability, increase the pressure on weak governments and push governments toward state failure. This paves the way for ethnic hostilities and widespread rioting. As an added effect, reductions in Western Official Development Assistance, due to smaller budgets in developed countries, may strengthen a vicious cycle. It is also to be expected that in countries with a weak democratic tradition, economic pressure increases the likelihood that leaders will resort to repression to maintain control fueling further instability.

Major currency reserves in the hands of illiberal democracies and countries with 'state capitalism' create an opening for mercantilism. These states use the financial instrument strategically in order to protect and advance their own interests. Russia, for instance, extended a credit-line to Kyrgyzstan and Manas airfield was shut down for American forces. China has invested heavily in several strategic sectors globally, signing deals with mining companies and states, as well as with oil-exporting countries.

There is also renewed concern over the actions of particular state vehicles in the financial system, in this case government-sponsored Sovereign Wealth Funds.

10) In March 2009 the NYMEX Crude oil future hovered between US\$ 40 and US\$ 45, while in early August 2008 the price stood at more than US\$ 140 per barrel.

11) Opening a new chapter in its long-running natural gas dispute, in late February 2009 GazProm warned it would cut off all gas supplies to Ukraine if it failed to pay US\$ 400 million of outstanding payments.

RELEVANT QUOTES

FINANCIAL CRISIS & GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION

National Military	Financial and Economic turmoil and failure
NATO	<p>Continued impact of globalisation – both the continued globalisation of economic and security issues or, conversely, the reversal of globalisation brought about by severe economic recession will have consequences for the security policies of the Alliance. Failed states will proliferate and if member nations choose to withdraw into ‘fortress NATO/EU’, unresolved issues will continue to percolate and boil over, drawing the Alliance into a more severe security crisis at a later date.</p>
National Policy Planners	<p>A continuing depressed world economy will only serve to increase the potential for increasing unrest, feelings of helplessness, isolation and discontent among those populations most impacted while limiting the ability of those better off to help alleviate the problems. This is a situation that breeds terrorism, opens opportunities for government failure and takeover by those less inclined toward democratic ideals and freedoms.</p>
Think Tanks	<p>The financial crisis will slow down efforts to create a sustainable economy and environment. As the world is confronted with a structural energy and resource problem, exploding energy/raw material prices are likely after the end of a recession. Structural shortages may lead to energy/raw material nationalism by anti-Western states. Together with the climate change this may lead to resource conflicts in e.g. the North Pole area.</p>

Industry

Western societies, and increasingly those in emerging economies, are demanding ever more sophisticated services and solutions to support everyday existence. By definition, these in turn require unprecedented investment by governments and corporations, ... an increasingly broad network of low-cost economies are relied upon to satisfy the appetites of the more sophisticated economies. Effectively, points of vulnerability now extend far beyond the ability of individual nation-states and regional alliances to protect.

International Organisations & EU

I consider the security of nations' economic and financial well-being the overriding security issue for the next 5-10 years. ... The events in the financial markets and, increasingly at the national economic levels have incurred costs that rival the expense of military-oriented security efforts. Whole sectors require unprecedented bailouts, the associated budget deficits – the US deficit is expected to run to around 7 percent of GDP. These issues will determine voter behaviour much more than the 'traditional' security issues (Russia – also post-Cold War, China, terrorism).

Students

The most important security issue has to do with the global financial system, specifically the strain war spending is having on the United States. To stave off global economic collapse the United States needs to get out of the red ink fast, and start reducing its debt. The same is true for major European economies, and the Japanese. So, end the pointless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and adopt a concerted policy of non-military intervention.

IMPACT ON THE WEST

The financial crisis began in the West, rocking the American housing market in 2007 and spiralling into a global economic downturn by 2009. This has had two profound effects on NATO. First, there is a first-order effect on military budgets. As national budgets tighten, and governments pass large packages meant to stimulate the economy, engage in financial bailouts and take budgetary measures, defence organisations will see an increasing pressure on their resources.

Second, and possibly more important, is the system effect. This acts as a catalyst for the relative decline of the United States and the rise of a multipolar system, but it also leads to greater instability.

One of the effects of the housing slump in the United States and the subsequent global credit drought was the weakening of the US dollar, making it more expensive for the United States to borrow money on the international market and finance its account deficit. Similarly, given the accompanying inflationary effect on US currency, it also increases the likelihood that states reduce their dollar holdings, thereby weakening the dollar's position as the premier reserve currency even more.

This trend is firmly connected with various geostrategic events. The American-led war in Iraq has cost the United States significant political credit among oil-producing states, much to the despair of the US Treasury. It has spawned both economic and political arguments in Middle Eastern states to reduce US currency holdings. The financial crisis only reinforces this trend.

The financial crisis hurts the credibility of the US-dominated liberal market system, rendering it vulnerable to the criticism of states that promote a measure of 'controlled capitalism', such as China, Russia or Venezuela. According to an expert in the think tank community a key challenge constituted:



The decreasing legitimacy of a global financial and security system that is growingly perceived as not fairly reflecting the political and economic situation of the world.



As far as the financial system is concerned, the declaration by the leaders of the recent G20 summit is informative. It underlined that the Bretton Woods institutions should be reformed to:

“

More adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness.¹²

”

This implies more influence for Asian states in the global financial institutions. However, an expert in the think tank community added:

“

[...] And consequently [this will enhance] the attractiveness of alternative systems, such as the Chinese model. This will challenge liberal, free economies.

”

A dilemma appears for Western states. As a think tank expert pointed out:

“

How can the West fully accept other models if those models do not respect human rights and continue to cause large numbers of refugees to flee to the West?

”

The dilemma that ensues is whether the West is able to accept a world where its liberal values are no longer considered dominant. While most states are affected by the economic crisis, some will be more affected than others. To the West, it means a weakening of the credibility of the Western system, stimulating the relative decline of Western economic power. There was widespread concern among the participants in *New Horizons* over the implications of the global economic crisis. As an expert in the think tank community acknowledged, the global economic downturn would have a negative impact on the position of Western powers:

“

It is not clear to me that the US and EU will retain their strength with the rise of China and India. Assuming that China's recent economic stimulus sustains its own growth and helps globally, it should further enhance its economic and political power. ... The EU also could be weakened with the growing power of China and India. And now Russia is again reclaiming its voice in world affairs.

”

Finally, the global economic downturn also affects the West's ability to supply security, while it will be in increased demand. A weakening of Western economies is likely to

12) G20, *Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy*, G20 Declaration (Washington D.C.: G20, November 15, 2008).

impact the reach of Western security and defence policy. As a concomitant effect of the crisis, defence budgets will be under pressure. They are likely to remain the same or decrease. With Western troops stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is also little spare capacity to engage in new large-scale military operations, except when vital interests are at stake.

A national policy planner captured this argument and said:



A continuing depressed world economy will only serve to increase the potential for increasing unrest, feelings of helplessness, isolation and discontent among those populations most impacted, while limiting the ability of those better off to help alleviate the problems. This is a situation that breeds terrorism, opens opportunities for government failure and takeover by those less inclined toward democratic ideals and freedoms. In this context, the Middle East, the Trans-Caucasus region, and Africa will remain 'worst case'.



This must lead to a rationalisation of security policy and a greater reluctance among Western governments to get involved in non-vital operations. However, as was pointed out above, the international security environment is getting increasingly unstable. While the demand for stabilisation and crisis management operations may grow across the globe, NATO member states will find it more and more difficult to respond.

Collaboration is key. As an expert in the think tank community stated, NATO's Washington Treaty Article 2 mentions that NATO member states commit themselves to:



Eliminating conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.



Perhaps now is the best time to give new meaning to that article.

In summary, the global economic crisis presents a strategic dilemma for the Alliance. Although the global economic crisis affects Western states, it leads to increased 'friction' in the international security environment. As a result, the demand for NATO capabilities will increase, and the Alliance may not be able to deliver.

The debate on the impact of the financial crisis and the global economic recession above leads to the following strategic dilemma for the Alliance:




STRATEGIC DILEMMA

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION WILL CREATE MORE AND GREATER SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE WEST, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WEST AND WEAKEN NATO'S CAPABILITY TO ACT.




SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

RESOURCE & ENERGY SCARCITY



CLIMATE CHANGE



Resource and Energy Scarcity



[There is a] need for honest and realistic appraisal of global warming and resources issues.



-Participant in the community of think tank experts

Another element of the major trend in the security environment is the dynamic of resource and energy scarcity. It is closely related to the global economic crisis and the shift to a multipolar system, and was recognised as such by the participants in *New Horizons*. Throughout the consultations resource and energy scarcity, or the increasing dependency of states on a depleting stock of oil and natural gas, raw materials, minerals and water, was the concept alluded to most by the participants.

There are several factors driving this dynamic, the most important being that the supply of several key resources, both hydrocarbons and minerals, is finite and approaching. Apart from political instability in producing states, this has led to substantial price increases over the past years. A key indicator has been the price of crude oil, which climaxed in the summer of 2008 at over 145 dollars per barrel.¹³ The high price of oil is also caused by the increased global consumption in states like India and China, an undersupply in global refinery capacity and importantly, there is a decreasing availability of easily accessible oil. The supply of cheaply processed crude oil is increasingly under pressure, now that reserves in the Middle East are likely to approach exhaustion in

13) On July 3, 2008 NYMEX crude oil futures traded at US\$ 145,29 per barrel.

the next three decades. The accelerated demand for oil in developing countries will continue to put pressure on available reserves. The major growth in demand will come from Asian states. Even though the current global economic recession has led to a short-term decrease in the price, global oil supply will be strained as global economic growth recovers. This is particularly caused by an aftershock of the economic recession, which has led many expensive oil exploration projects to be put on hold, precisely at the moment when global demand is likely to increase. This will lead to a situation where oil and gas should be seen as increasingly scarce commodities. The limited availability of alternative energy sources further underlines this dynamic. The geopolitical implication emerging from this trend is that the remaining oil and gas reserves are increasingly concentrated in a few states, predominantly in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia.

Aside from hydrocarbons, increased global demand for various minerals will strain limited supplies. If the consumption increases as expected, a number of key minerals, including iodine, lead, silver, antimony, tin and uranium will be severely depleted in the next two decades. China's demand for metals has increased by seventeen percent per year for the past five years. It accounted for seventy percent of the increase in global demand for specific metals, such as aluminium, copper, lead and zinc.¹⁴ One other aspect of energy and resource scarcity is access to fresh water. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are already considered to be suffering from absolute water scarcity. They will most likely be joined by China, India, Pakistan and South Africa around 2025.¹⁵ At the level of geopolitics, according to the authors of a report on national security and climate change:



*Access to vital resources, primarily food and water can be an added causative factor of conflicts ...*¹⁶



Most of the comments by the respondents however, were keen to emphasise scarcity in the supply of energy, particularly oil and natural gas. While the global economic crisis reduces the demand for oil and natural gas products, leading to an overall price decrease, the participants realised that resource scarcity will make a strong imprint on the international security dynamic. According to one NATO official:

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- 14) Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques, *OECD environmental outlook to 2030* (Paris: OECD/IFT, 2008).
 - 15) International Water Management Institute, *Project Water Scarcity in 2025*, <http://www.lk.iwmi.org/resarchive/wsmap.htm>.
 - 16) CNA CORP ALEXANDRIA VA., *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007).

“

Potential conflict [will] result from the combination of growing economies, growing shortages of industrial and natural resources and competition for these resources. ... The current economic crisis will not break this long-term threat. ...The interest of big emerging economies like China and India will grow for regions with essential resources and will lead to tensions with Europe and US. The potential for conflict will increase, if not in 5-10 years, then in 15-20 years. US and Europe cannot afford to ignore this. The problem will focus on the Middle East, Africa, the Nordic Area, but can be the cause of conflict in unexpected areas.

”

Similarly, an expert in the think tank community stated:

“

The financial crisis will slow down efforts to create a sustainable economy and environment. As the world is confronted with a structural energy and resource problem, exploding energy/raw material prices are likely after the end of a recession. Structural shortages may lead to energy/raw material nationalism by anti-Western states. Together with climate change this may lead to resource conflicts in e.g. the North Pole area.

”

Concerns over natural resources are directly related to the rise of new powers. They may either be consumers that compete over a shrinking pool of oil and gas with the West, or producers controlling this shrinking pool. More specifically, it relates to China and Russia. As a middle-tier military officer noted:

“

[Key challenges are] the global emergence of China and the global re-emergence of Russia. Their rapidly increasing resource requirements and growing economies are forcing them to expand in an often reckless manner, which poses consequential security threats in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

”

RELEVANT QUOTES

RESOURCE & ENERGY SCARCITY

National Military	The growing fight over resources. Due to the rapid increase of the total world population there will be clear shortages in resources like water, food, energy and even moderate space for living.
NATO	The combination of growing economies, growing shortages of industrial/natural resources and competition for these resources. Potential conflict because of that. The current economic crisis will not break this long-term threat. Several regional conflicts in Africa already have this as one of the important root causes. The interest of big emerging economies like China and India will grow for regions with essential resources and will lead to tensions with Europe and the US. The potential for conflict will increase, if not in 5-10 years, then in 15-20 years. US and Europe cannot afford to ignore this. The problem will focus on the Middle East, Africa, the Nordic Area, but can be the cause of conflict in unexpected areas.
National Policy Planners	Access to energy in combination with a lack of and troubled access to resources.
Industry	Energy can be used as a political tool. Possible conflicts might erupt in relation to access to energy resources.
NGO	Increasing competition over scarce resources: land, water, oil, fish, etc. This will express itself along ethnic or religious lines and has the potential to affect even areas/countries hitherto described or perceived as stable. Obviously climate change is starting to affect the security of livelihood and security of residence of many people worldwide. Local systems cannot adapt quickly enough to changing circumstances.

**International
Organisations
& EU**

As an important building block for economic security, energy security can be seen as the second most important security issue. This has ramifications for the Middle East policy: a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict should urgently be searched for, without these countries using the conflict for political leverage with the large NATO countries. A more fruitful and rational relationship with the Arab world – i.e. unburdened by the Arab-Israeli conflict – is sorely needed. This is needed for a more rational energy policy, as well as to provide a better forum for some of the immigration issues in the EU – a hot issue on many national political agendas. It also has ramifications for the relations with other large energy suppliers, Russia in particular.

Think tanks

Resource conflicts are being fought on the basis of both 'greed and need'. In some parts of the developing world, the abundance of lucrative natural resources (e.g. diamonds in Africa and opium in Afghanistan) are the cause of increasing numbers of mainly intrastate conflicts in 'failing' states. While this trend is likely to continue, the greater longer term risk is of resource scarcity and energy insecurity, leading to major interstate conflict, especially in unstable parts of the world.

Students

Energy security; reduced availability of so-called 'easy' oil leads to a rise in the price of oil above the US\$ 200/barrel mark. Competition between China, India and the US for energy supplies. Increased Russian use of the natural gas supply as a foreign policy tool.

Most of the projected increase in global demand for oil and natural gas will come from China and India, since more and more energy will be needed to fuel their growing economies. Between 2000 and 2006 these two states accounted for nearly half the global energy demand, including eighty-five percent of the global coal demand and conversely also, two-thirds of global CO₂ emissions.¹⁷ According to the International Energy Agency, the proportion of cars per person in China will equal the amount in the United States by 2012, and the oil consumption of China alone will equal the total projected production of Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ Not surprisingly, China and other major consumers are acting strategically and building close relations with oil-producing states in order to guarantee their energy supplies. The risk is that this could lead to resource competition between, for instance, China, India and Western states.

According to one respondent there is also a relation between the financial crisis and resource scarcity that should be connected with the business-to-government relations in the West. Aside from the geopolitical consequences of resource scarcity, Western states may be increasingly vulnerable to energy scarcity as a result of their dependence on the private sector for energy and resource exploration and production. One expert in the think tank community pointed out how the financial crisis may impact national security through under investment in several key sectors:



[The] (1) current financial crisis makes it more difficult to get credits at favourable rates, (2) important investment projects for example in the energy sector are already being deferred, which paves the ground for future price hikes due to the lack of adequate infrastructure [oil production] capacities, (3) global recession will continue to increase the focus on competitiveness which could be detrimental to investments in security-relevant capabilities such as spare capacities, training and education of employees.



While the financial crisis leads to a temporary decrease in oil consumption and a decrease in the oil price, over the next five to ten years oil prices are likely to rise again. States like Russia, Iran and Venezuela stand to benefit. These states combine an

17) International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook* (Washington D.C.: Distributed by OECD Publications and Information Center, 2007).

18) James Kanter, "IEA says oil prices will stay 'very high,' threatening global growth," *The International Herald Tribune*, October 31, 2007, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/31/business/oil.php>.

economy that depends mostly on oil and natural gas exports with a political leadership that is not pro-Western and seeking a stronger voice in the international arena.

NATO IMPLICATIONS FOR RESOURCE AND ENERGY SCARCITY

Concerns over resource scarcity have significant implications for the political-military strategy of NATO, as was noted by a NATO official:



The control of energy resources by a limited number of producers will place Alliance countries in a precarious position of having to choose between security options that are drafted with protecting energy supplies in mind. This will give undue influence to nations such as Russia within Alliance policy-making as the position of member nations could be developed to retain energy supplies for populations.



As a result of concerns over resource scarcity, NATO will focus steadily on countries like Russia or the Middle East purely from the perspective of energy security concerns. Additionally, several other threats can be redubbed as primarily energy security threats, like piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As a respondent in the think tank community argued, piracy affects both energy transits, as well as the broader sector of merchant shipping:



A major concern here is the piracy off the Horn of Africa which is seriously disrupting shipping and driving up costs which could have an increasingly strong impact on the global economy.



PROTECTING TRANSIT ROUTES

The role of NATO in dealing with energy scarcity was heavily debated. Participants wholeheartedly felt that energy security was a principle issue of concern. Whether represented by the depletion of hydrocarbons, or the realisation that oil and natural gas were increasingly concentrated in fewer countries, thus facilitating their exploitation as political tools. It led to the appreciation that two sets of strategies should be pursued. On the one hand, safeguarding the energy sources that remained and on the other hand, preparing for a post-hydrocarbon age. As to the first strategy, it was believed to

amount to two preventive options. On the one hand, the protection of maritime transit routes by physically protecting the shipments. For instance, a think tank expert said that the:

“

Discussion on ‘energy security’ at NATO [should be limited] to the protection of infrastructure, sea lanes.

”

A national policy planner further commented that:

“

NATO could provide security of infrastructure and transit routes and project stability through its partnerships, through training and exercises.

”

NATO could also engage in military manoeuvres in key areas and support third countries by training security forces.

This type of energy security operation also has a strong overtone of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Among the more elaborate proposals, a NATO official suggested a large-scale monitoring network for securing energy transshipments against piracy:

“

World trade is done mostly by sea and any attempt to hamper it by violent means (Somali piracy might just be sea training experiences or attempts to get the skills to conduct other type of terrorist ops at sea) might be of great prejudice to the economy of some countries in particularly and to the world economy in general.

”

As a result, the NATO official offered, the Alliance should pay:

“

Special attention to sea control, choke points controls and harbour controls by all possible means. Develop new means of monitoring all kinds of boats and ships, alike airplanes. Pay special attention to megaports. New technologies, new ships and choppers, with new capabilities. Creation of armed teams to embark on trade vessels (like airmarshalls).

”

STABILISING TRANSIT COUNTRIES

Secondly, respondents felt that the Alliance could take up the larger task of stabilising energy transit countries. One senior expert at a think tank argued that NATO could do more to help stabilise key resource-producing or exporting states:

“

NATO also has a role to play in advancing homeland security/ resilience in producer and transit countries. The more we stabilise these regions from within, the more we reduce the need for outside intervention and help advance the security of NATO homeland.

”

As a necessary element in shaping a policy towards stabilising key energy countries, NATO's activities would need to be part of a broad strategy including different instruments of power. It also included expressing a coherent security strategy on the topic. A senior NATO official suggested that:

“

[The] US and Europe, so NATO and also EU, should change [their] security strategy towards the regions where this competition for resources can occur. The security strategy must have more of a comprehensive approach in which diplomatic, military, development, economic support, are focused on stabilising those regions and also engaging other players.

”

From the perspective of stabilising key energy transit countries, the Georgia-Russia war can be seen as an example where conflict could severely impact energy deliveries and become a direct concern to NATO. Moving along this path could lead to serious implications for NATO's principle of collective defence and the interpretation of Article V of the Washington Treaty. If the Alliance decided that this is a core mission, it could lead to extending a de facto security guarantee over several non-NATO states.

FIXING THE OIL ADDICTION

Furthermore, an oft-mentioned solution to the problem of energy security was the necessity to move away from the dependency on oil and natural gas imports. This view is closely linked to several elements mentioned with respect to climate change later on. As a representative from a non-governmental organisation noted, what was required was:

“

Massive investment in alternative sustainable energy development. Focus on decentralised power generation, away from national grids which have built-in problems of effective scaling up of alternatives. Ensure greater development benefits from the sale of gas and oil.

”

Or, as a student contributed:

“

Countries should strive for energy autarky through new technologies.

”

Such a shift, however, would not be enough to avoid conflict in the medium term. As the student continued, even by rapidly investing in alternative sources of energy:

“

it is probably close to inevitable that conflict will arise, as the transformation from one energy source to another (for example moving from oil and gas to nuclear and solar power) will unlikely be a completely smooth process. The best the West may do – although it may not prevent conflict elsewhere – is at least to have created enough alternative energy sources for its own survival, and have enough military power to protect these resources from others.

”

Short of moving away from oil and natural gas consumption, several ideas were presented to develop a new international energy regime. Variants included the creation of a new forum “*incorporating producer, transit, and consumer countries*”, a set of international agreements among suppliers, buyers and transporters of energy resources, an international agreement such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative focusing on regulation and transparency, or, as a senior think tank expert

suggested, the creation of “*a permanent security council-like organisation on energy and minerals with executive powers*”. A similar suggestion for a new multilateral institutional approach voiced among national policy planners was to create a “multilateral fuel bank for nuclear energy”. Within this context NATO was promoted as a possible “*political forum to discuss energy-related issues, from the security angle*”. In such a new global partnership or regime, NATO “*could play a political role to stabilise. NATO could play a security role by protecting energy infrastructure or transport*”.

Although energy security has not always been explicitly on the NATO agenda, the results of the *New Horizons* project show that it figures all too prominently in the minds of the practitioners and experts of transatlantic security.

Perhaps the most creative response came from a NATO official who said: “*there are no solutions to these problems as they are unsolvable*”. Yet, nevertheless providing a solution, he said:



As soon as problems come, and they will come at an accelerating speed, we need to adapt as good as we can. We have to develop flexibility, agility, and the ability to learn from our mistakes.



A strategy based on monitoring the situation and developing an ad hoc approach would be very flexible, although not optimal.

We now turn to a topic which respondents connected with resource and energy scarcity, namely the effects of climate change. Here, a security issue arises of particular concern to the Alliance.

CLIMATE CHANGE

The concerns associated with climate change directly relate to resource and energy scarcity. Resource scarcity and climate change are mutually reinforcing, as the wider search for increasingly scarcer resources may result in more pressure on the environment. At the same time, climate change has a direct correlation with greenhouse emissions and the reliance on fossil fuels. As states cope with depleting resources, environmental considerations may become less important. Also, as a result of the effects of global warming the Arctic region is likely to become a new area of competition, in the quest for remaining oil reserves.

RELEVANT QUOTES

CLIMATE CHANGE

National Military	Climate change, food shortage, deteriorating living conditions in developing countries with high birth rates will accelerate economic and political instability and will increase the probability of pandemic around the globe.
NATO	Climate change – man-influenced climatic change and its consequences will continue to bring security and economic issues to the forefront that will have to be addressed. Rising sea levels, drought, flooding, etc. will have implications on the policies adopted by member nations and the focus they place on security issues.
National Policy Planners	Degradation of environment and climate change.
Industry	The transatlantic community could feel the consequences of other countries being impacted by issues like water scarcity and desertification.
NGO	Increasing competition over scarce resources: land, water, oil, fish, etc. This will express itself along ethnic or religious lines and has the potential to affect even areas/countries hitherto described or perceived as stable. Obviously, climate change is starting to affect security of livelihood and security of residence of many people worldwide. Local systems cannot adapt quickly enough to changing circumstances.
International Organisations and European Union	Climate change will begin to impact vulnerable areas and populations. Areas become uninsurable, or are ‘given up’ by authorities. This in turn will result in civil unrest, civil disobedience and in some cases violence.
Students	Increasing competition in the Arctic region, tension between Russia, Norway, the US and Canada.

Think Tanks

The effects of climate change are already being felt, so whatever ‘corrective’ actions the world community adopts, further significant impacts are inevitable. These are likely to include acceleration in the breakdown of ecosystems and more severe ‘natural’ disasters and food shortages, in turn leading to much higher levels of migration, increased human suffering and greater social unrest.

Furthermore, climate change is a catalyst for political volatility and “acts as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions in the world”.¹⁹

According to a think tank expert climate change will lead to “acceleration in the breakdown of ecosystems and more severe ‘natural’ disasters and food shortages, in turn leading to much higher levels of migration, increased human suffering and greater social unrest”.

SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE CHANGE

The consensus among the respondents was that in order to cope with the dynamic of climate change international cooperation will be necessary. A think tank expert noted that challenges associated with climate change could benefit from concerted international action. Such would, for instance, be the case with an expected increase in natural disasters precipitated by climate change:



The recent tsunami and earthquake disasters have made it clear that concerted action enables relief to be provided faster and more effectively. An organisation like NATO, EU or UN is also in a better position to put pressure on an affected country to allow the aid to go where it is needed. It is almost impossible for individual donor countries to break through political blockades and corruption, but there is some hope of making inroads with concerted action.



19) CNA CORP ALEXANDRIA VA., *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* p. 6.

A NATO official concurred, saying that:

“

[Climate change] is a global problem requiring the involvement of the UN, NATO, EU and other regional organisations. NATO forces must develop the resiliency to adjust to changing climate and react to its consequences.

”

As did a national policy planner:

“

... [A] coordinated international answer with divisions of labour. UN on the broad scale, EU on the economic and societal sides of it and NATO on the security aspects.

”

However, little insights were offered how to operationalise this. Participants believed that dealing with climate change would be more difficult in a multipolar world, thereby increasing the need for international action.

One creative solution to help alleviate some of the impact of climate change came from a think tank expert. The respondent proposed to implement energy and environmental standards in security-related reconstruction and stabilisation activities. In other words, to perform reconstruction activities while taking climate change issues into account:

“

Help poorer countries build dams and levees, irrigation systems, quake-proof housing, etc. More emphasis on developing drought-resistant plants, plants for shorter growing seasons and double crop seasons, simple alternative energy techniques such as solar panels and windmills to provide energy to remote villages, etc. Build manufacturing capacity for such items closer to where the need is to provide employment. More timely sharing of accurate (not ideologically driven) information to assess the (future) needs of individual countries and provide accordingly.

”

THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE ARCTIC

There was limited discussion over NATO's specific role in dealing with climate change. For NATO, the primary concerns associated with climate change relate to specific crises that may be triggered by climate change, such as increasing state failure. In this sense, climate change is considered to be a catalyst for other threats and NATO focuses on the threat rather than the catalyst. According to a national policy planner, NATO could play a role in dealing with climate change-related events:

“ Only when it comes to crisis management and crisis response, where a strong military capacity could be the only and ultimate solution to provide assistance and limit the threat, NATO could have added value. ”

The only aspect of climate change that was considered to be truly affecting the Alliance was resource competition. One NATO official identified a key challenge as:

“ Climate change in connection with resource struggles. ”

This statement referred to concerns over the Arctic as a new area of resource competition. Above, we already published two responses by participants referring to the role of resource scarcity and the Arctic. One of the possible areas of instability as a direct result of warming waters is the Arctic Circle. As a student commented, there is a concern over:

“ Increasing competition in the Arctic region, tension between Russia, Norway, the US and Canada. ”

The Arctic Shelf is believed to hold perhaps as much as twice the oil of Saudi Arabia, which currently holds the world's largest known reserves. It may contain roughly 20% of all remaining oil and 30% of unexplored natural gas reserves. In addition, it contains sizeable deposits of gold, copper, zinc and other minerals. All this speculation and anticipation make it of prime strategic importance. As early as 2013, oil and natural gas will be pumped from a major Russian field in the Arctic. This is the same year that a United Nations deadline expires regarding the controversial demarcation of the Arctic Continental Shelf. In other words, as a result of receding ice the states along the Arctic will have easier access to scarce resources, thus increasing the potential for a resource race. Of the five Arctic states, four are member of NATO.

In the Secretary-General's recent speech, there was a clear indication that NATO had a role to play in relation to the expanded importance of the Arctic:



The High North is going to require even more of the Alliance's attention in the coming years ... if we do see increased activity in [the oil exploration] sector, and in energy in particular, then the Alliance, although not exclusively, will need to take this into account. ... Should NATO, as an organisation, as an Alliance, discuss the possibility of stepping up its [military] focus in the region? And if so, what form should this take? ... NATO needs to identify where the Alliance, with its unique competencies, can add value. ... Clearly, the High North is a region of strategic interest to the Alliance.²⁰



Projecting stability and protecting critical infrastructure were mentioned as key items in the Secretary-General's speech. Regarding implication of resource scarcity for the Alliance, the options have been presented above.

NATO's experience with resource issues is limited. The 1999 Strategic Concept stated that: *"Alliance security interests can be affected by ... the disruption of the flow of vital resources"*. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008 the North Atlantic Council decided to accept a paper on "NATO's Role in Energy Security". This report mentioned five areas in which NATO can be active, including "projecting stability" and "supporting the protection of critical infrastructure". It fails however, to tell us what NATO's strategy should be. In view of the attention paid to this topic by the key stakeholder communities of the transatlantic community, it seems the time is ripe to tackle this issue. The considerations above lead to the formulation of the following strategic dilemma:

STRATEGIC DILEMMA


RESOURCE AND ENERGY SCARCITY ARE HELD TO BE KEY CHALLENGES, BUT RESPONDENTS BELIEVE **NATO** REMAINS UNDECIDED HOW TO RESPOND.

20) J. de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North," Reykjavik, 29 January 2009, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090129a.html>.

SECURITY TRENDS

SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

PROLIFERATION



Proliferation

The respondents of *New Horizons* identified a range of security trends that are exponents of the international security dynamic. These issues are interconnected and concern proliferation, state failure, terrorism and non-state actors, demographic trends and vulnerabilities to Western societies.

Proliferation is a catch-all phrase to describe the distribution of technologies, mostly associated with weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. Commonly, proliferation has centred on the spread of nuclear weapons. Concerns over this specific element of proliferation have increased over the past decade. Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998, triggering the fear of a regional nuclear arms race with India. At the end of 2006 North Korea joined the club of nuclear states and it continues to develop ballistic missiles with a possible intercontinental reach. Iran pursues a nuclear programme which Western observers believe may be for weapons development. Pakistan's political instability further adds to the risk of weapons-related material eventually falling into the hands of terrorist group, and details emerging from the unravelling of AQ Khan's private proliferation network indicate that significant loopholes exist in the existing non-proliferation regime. This increases the likelihood that other developing countries may develop such weapons. While the nuclear non-proliferation regime is weakened, international efforts to control the spread of biological and chemical weapons are similarly at risk.

RELEVANT QUOTES

PROLIFERATION

National Military	Nuclear countries pushed to the limit by whatever means and or opposing countries ... Terrorist attacks ... might push two nuclear countries to the limit.
NATO	Increasingly destructive options [available] to small groups – the proliferation of technology and the accelerated pace of technological development will give small groups access to increasingly destructive capabilities including CBRN options that are made available due to technology advances that are proliferated through the infosphere. Attacking the Alliance asymmetrically will be the most likely option taken by these groups.
National Policy Planners	Terrorism and proliferation of WMD, especially the availability of these weapons to radical non-government actors or non-democratic states with a ballistic missile capability.
Industry	Speed of technology spread: whether knowledge via internet, communications ability, miniaturisation of products and weapons.
NGO	Technology proliferation giving increasingly destructive capabilities to small groups.
International Organisations & EU	Unchecked nuclear proliferation has significant potential for so-called low-frequency, high-impact disruptions. As more countries ..., obtain a 'stake in the system', countries' willingness to cooperate with safeguards and allow inspections will increase. It is key that some countries not be considered 'more equal than others' and avoid good faith and rigorous inspection.
Think Tanks	Pakistan could collapse. This will bring nuclear weapons in the hands of extremists?

Students

The spread of nuclear weapons and the increasing dangers through proliferation. Terrorist networks will get a hold of nuclear weapons.

The primary challenge associated with proliferation, as identified by the respondents, concerns terrorist non-state actors obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation issues were mostly mentioned in relation to advances in technology. This is not surprising, as proliferation depends on the spread of technology. Also, there was a very clear correlation to institutional failure, as respondents perceived a weakened non-proliferation regime. Finally, proliferation was connected to terrorism and non-state actors. An oft-mentioned concern was the notion that terrorist groups could lay their hands on nuclear weapons.

A military officer said:



[A key challenge is] the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use as a political weapon by poor states or transnational actors.



Regarding states, the most prominent threat to proliferation singled out by the participants was Iran, and to a lesser extent North Korea. While the majority of comments related to nuclear weapons, references to biological weapons were hardly mentioned at all, and to chemical weapons they were nearly non-existent.

A further concern identified by the participants was the potential that proliferation issues could either lead to nuclear arms races in South Asia or the Middle East, or that they would in fact be used in an interstate conflict. As a military officer stated, a key issues is *“nuclear countries pushed to the limit by whatever means and or [by] opposing countries”*. An expert in the think tank community included *“the proliferation of ballistic missile technology”*.

Beyond the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, several participants took a broader approach, focusing on and emphasizing the spread of technology in general. A senior representative from the industry representative argued that proliferation in and of itself posed a challenge, including:



Knowledge via internet, communications ability, miniaturisation of products and weapons.



The spread of technology was believed to be a concern because, as a representative from the industry explained, technology has always stood at the basis of Western predominance. Now that technology was more widely available, it was impacting the West's competitive advantage:



Technological superiority is at best transitory; project life cycles (in terms of competitive advantage/full utility) are shorter and financial cost greater than ever before. The greater the cost, the more prone to delayed introduction and outset obsolescence ... and pressure to unrealistically extend equipment in-service lifespans.



A NATO official avoided a similar industry-focused approach, but did point at the military operational challenges linked to the proliferation of technology:



[The key challenge is the] increasingly destructive options allowed to small groups –the proliferation of technology and the accelerated pace of technological development will give small groups access to increasingly destructive capabilities, including CBRN options that are made available due to technology advances that are proliferated through the infosphere. Attacking the Alliance asymmetrically will be the most likely option taken by these groups.



A national policy planner agreed:



The proliferation of nuclear technology ... might lead to terrorist organisations possessing a nuclear or radiological bomb (dirty bomb) and the risk that they will use it.



The respondents pointed to the ineffectiveness of traditional deterrence when confronting a terrorist group armed with a nuclear weapon lies in. A senior NATO official said:

“

As soon as they [terrorists] have those means, they can use them, without becoming a target for retaliation themselves. The classic risk of mutual assured destruction then does not exist anymore, which at the same time in the classic view has been the guarantee that WMD have not been used yet.

”

As a think tank expert said:

“

Deterrence from suicidal terrorists with a martyr complex is extremely important.

”

A possible consequence is the necessity to revisit the nuclear deterrent posture of the Alliance as this remains primarily based on deterring interstate nuclear warfare. Yet the primary concern today is the connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction.

NATO'S ROLE IN PROLIFERATION

The discussion on NATO's role in addressing the challenge of proliferation can be divided into two segments. First, NATO could be an instrument to enforce a newly developed and strengthened international non-proliferation regime. Second, NATO should address its nuclear policy and revisit the underlying conceptual principles of its deterrent posture.

A senior military official mentioned that there is a role for NATO in counter-proliferation activities and it could be a part of a new international regime:

“

NATO cannot ignore the WMD threat, thus the issue must be on NATO's agenda. Despite NATO having only a secondary role in the WMD solution, promoting a policy that supports WMD counter-proliferation is well within NATO's sphere.

”

However, it is necessary to understand that even if NATO wants to be active as a supporting organisation to a new international non-proliferation regime, other international organisations will have to embrace this as well.

As mentioned above, proliferation was connected to the concept of institutional failure in roughly one quarter of the entries. As a representative from the industry argued:



Having the relevant international organisations working together in a comprehensive way to try to anticipate security implications [connected to proliferation] and develop in advance anticipatory measures/solutions that can help deal with the problem.



The UN was deemed most appropriate to take the global lead in monitoring more stringent controls on proliferation, NATO's role in dealing with proliferation was that it could act as a potential political pressure group, and if necessary as a 'stick'.

The solution mentioned most frequently was to renegotiate the international non-proliferation regime. Creating a revamped international regime required, according to another military officer:



A multilateral approach based on a broad framework of legitimacy. The role of the UN as the main body responsible for international peace and stability should be strengthened and restored. All important regional actors have to support such an approach (China, USA, Russia, India).



Similarly, a broad international effort was necessary in order to have a chance at successfully addressing proliferation issues *"in states which are quite instable like Pakistan"*, according to one student participant. A respondent from the community of international organisations captured this logic:



As more countries ... obtain a 'stake in the system', countries' willingness to cooperate with safeguards and allow inspections will increase. It is key that some countries not be considered 'more equal than others' ...



The respondent above referred to the necessity to include the five declared nuclear powers to be part of IAEA, or successor regimes.

In fact, several respondents commented that the nuclear weapon states held the initiative to develop a robust non-proliferation regime. A national policy planner mentioned that it was necessary to:

“

Convince the nuclear weapon states to set the example of good governance regarding [nuclear and dual-use] technologies. Strengthen the IAEA safeguard regime by making it universally applicable. Ratification of CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] by the US and progress in the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. International action against violators of these regimes will benefit all.

”

A senior military official added that new international agreements need to be negotiated, and close cooperation between the declared nuclear powers will have to be reinforced. But apart from these diplomatic measures, the official advocated “[a]doption of coercive measures, including the use of force, under United Nations auspices, to support the new regime. This would be an important addition to the current non-proliferation regime which has limited coercive elements.”

On the military instruments required, a national policy planner elaborated on the consequences for force structuring. He promoted the need for expeditionary forces as well as greater sensitivity to local cultures in stabilisation operations:

“

[Dealing with proliferation requires that] ... transformation of military in to a more deployable and sustainable force should continue, effective doctrines for asymmetric warfare ... [and] more sensitive approaches to culture differences while applying military power [be developed].

”

This statement was echoed by a NATO official who mentioned that the Alliance’s role in dealing with proliferation lay in:

“

- ◇ *Providing the means (human resources) to go to the field;*
- ◇ *[Providing] common means of AGS (Allied Ground Surveillance);*
- ◇ *Support[ing] the Pakistan Armed Forces;*
- ◇ *Satellite surveillance/intelligence;*
- ◇ *Western export controls of products needed to build biocultures.*

”

A NATO official provided several more detailed operational elements as part of this list, specifically focusing on decreasing the risks of proliferation by ship:

“

Improve the safety of shipping through: [maritime surveillance and intelligence], air and sea interrogations/boardings of odd contacts, [automatic identification] systems mandatory in all boats and ships. close control of choke points, cyberattack-proof systems at megaports, harbour controls, random sea patrols, intelligence.

”

Of specific concern was the threat posed by Iran. Yet there was discord over how to deal with it. On the one hand, a national policy planner believed there was no role for NATO, on the other hand, a think tank expert held out the necessity of “*credible deterrence*” including the installation of a missile defence system, supplemented by a reassurance of non-aggression.

REASSESSING DETERRENCE

Reassessing the concept of deterrence relied, according to a representative from the industry, on NATO’s credibility in this field, saying: “*The key is how to continue to deter use [of weapons of mass destruction]*”. He stated that this requires going “*back to the credibility of any alliance and how to develop or maintain this*”.

The implications of the proliferation challenge for NATO mostly focused on nuclear weapons in specific, rather than any other form of proliferation. A military officer said that dealing with proliferation, and reinforcing its credibility in this field, implies that NATO will have to minimise its own nuclear stockpiles and reassess its nuclear posture:

“

NATO must also be a part of [the] disarmament and subsequently minimise its nuclear potential. For the purposes of deterrence and fundamental credibility a certain number of nuclear weapons should (transparently declared) remain within the Alliance.

”

This statement was echoed by a national policy planner, who advocated reviewing NATO’s nuclear posture:

“

An open and fair debate should be initiated on the purpose and usefulness of NATO's nuclear task. Through this debate NATO is able to set an example and strengthen the nuclear disarmament article of the NPT.

”

Another military officer stated:

“

Nuclear powers must ... be forced to minimise their nuclear arms potential. Arms control must play a greater role within NATO policy, its objectives have to go together with a broad political strategy of confidence-building measures. To avoid the abuse of WMD by terrorists or such actors, the controlling function of the IAEA must ... be consolidated.

”

This is not to conclude that NATO's principle of nuclear deterrence should be relinquished, rather that its underlying assumptions should be revisited to correspond to the current security framework. The reassessment of NATO's nuclear posture appeared to receive wide support among the participants. In recent months, various policy articles have addressed this topic as well and have elaborated on a number of steps to be taken to move towards a complete reduction of the global amount of nuclear weapons.²¹ Finally, as a student participant argued, key is perhaps to accept *“to live with the notion that it is simply impossible to guarantee 100% security”* and that it made more sense to, as a NATO official argued to:

“

Develop resilience within populations to increase consequence management capacity.

”

In any case, proliferation was one of the most clear examples where countries rely on and turn towards the assistance of institutions and regimes. A role for NATO was envisaged, albeit not in detail.

The discussion on NATO's role as a partner in a new, reinvigorated non-proliferation framework and revisiting NATO posture of deterrence leads to the following dilemma:


21) Most notably, see Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008): 80-95.

STRATEGIC DILEMMA


DEFINING NATO'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION REQUIRES ADDRESSING NATO'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POSTURE AND THE ALLIANCE'S CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE. BUT THE BEST WAY TO DETER NON-STATE ACTORS IS AS YET UNKNOWN, AS IS THE NATURE OF A NEW NUCLEAR POSTURE AND A ROLE FOR THE ALLIANCE IN SUPPORTING A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY


STATE FAILURE




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
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
DEMOGRAPHICS



CHANGES IN WARFARE



TERRORISM



Key Security Trends



[A key challenge is] regional instability and mass migration. Fragile states will increasingly be unable and/or unwilling to provide basic security to their citizens and will fail to prevent crises. Spill-over effects will stimulate large-scale crises that NATO will see itself confronted with.



-Student participant in *New Horizons*



The issue is do we understand the vulnerabilities in our systems and can we build in effective defences before the enemy works out an effective counter.... It is our ability to invent the new system first that will keep us ahead of the enemy, just as it is his new look at the new system that will find the weakness that he can exploit.



-Industry representative in *New Horizons*

The following chapter groups several key security trends that shape the security environment. They are interrelated and oftentimes mutually reinforcing. The security trends are state failure, the rise of terrorism and non-state actors, demographic trends and Western societal vulnerabilities.

STATE FAILURE

State failure reflects the breakdown of government institutions and concerns a decreased ability of government to provide citizens with basic services, in this case security or an ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. States subjected to failure are often economically weak and politically volatile. They are vulnerable to outside shocks or exploitation from within by rebel groups, organised crime or terrorist organisations.²² In short, they are notoriously susceptible to internal instability. As a result, they have an impact on the broader security dynamic. The global economic recession and the dynamic of resource scarcity are likely to impact these states severely.

State failure, along with terrorism and non-state actors, was among the key strategic challenges, according to the respondents of New Horizons. A representative from the community of NGOs commented:

“

A [key challenge is a] loss of trust in state institutions and a reduction in the state's actual capacity to act on issues of inequity and uphold the rule of law. This is already coming to a head in the so-called failed states, but there will be an increasing number of failing states while even in stable democracies trust in the rule of law and the role of the state to look after every citizen's interest is undermined.

”

A NATO official asserted that state failure leads to a host of cross-border risks, among them the creation of:

“

safe havens for extremists, piracy, corruption and internal conflicts.

”

An expert at a think tank emphasised the wide impact failed states can have on stability, stating that:

“

The problems within those states can proliferate to others, and such states also provide a safe haven for powerful criminal interests that are active globally.

”

22) See also major studies on failed states such as Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index,” *Foreign policy*, no. 167 (2008): 64

According to the participants, state failure was mostly associated with challenges relating to non-state actors and the risk of terrorism.

A representative from an international organisation said a key challenge of state failure is that it breeds a nexus between crime and terrorism:

“

Global (ideology-driven) terrorism and international criminal activity start to overlap, particularly in countries where the rule of law is absent or seriously failing. This will lead to selective withdrawal from international cooperation and increasing barriers, primarily affecting the economically weak.

”

The challenge of state failure was connected to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as was observed by a representative from the industry:

“

Failed states are today safe harbours for terrorism. A nuclear failed state would represent a strategic threat.

”

Pakistan offered an example. A NATO official said that a pressing concern was that:

“

The volatile political situation of Pakistan might lead to the loss of control of some of its nuclear arsenal.

”

At times respondents singled out specific states subjected to failure that posed a security challenge. The countries mentioned most often in relation to state failure were Afghanistan, as result of the presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and Somalia, given the threat of piracy. Another state was Iraq. As a military officer noted:

“

The world cannot allow progress in Iraq to wane and relinquish in a return to violence and instability fuelled by ethnic and religious tensions. If Iraq becomes a failed state, the entire Middle East will retrograde back more than 25 years and the US and its partners will lose international legitimacy and be subject to an inundation of attacks both politically and physically.

”

RELEVANT QUOTES

STATE FAILURE

National Military

The spread of weak and failing states – see what is happening off the coast of Somalia, the epidemic of cholera in Zimbabwe, etc.

NATO

The consequences of failed states, such as safe havens for extremists, piracy, corruption and internal conflicts because of that which can go across borders.

National Policy Planners

The frozen conflicts of the Trans-Caucasus region, in combination with a Russian ‘attitude’ that may well contribute to instability and conflict in the region.

Industry

Any failed state is by definition no longer a state, but a lawless place where the law of the jungle rules. It may have geographic limits, but do we want to recreate the same state which is likely to break up along similar lines? Or do we want to rethink some of the ex-colonial states and break them into smaller more ethnically convergent states. Any lawless zone will inevitably be attractive to terrorist organisations.

NGO

A loss of trust in state institutions and a reduction in the state’s actual capacity to act on issues of inequity and uphold the rule of law. This is already coming to a head in the so-called failed states, but there will be an increasing number of failing states while even in stable democracies trust in the rule of law and the role of the state to look after every citizen’s interest is undermined. Increase in crime and crime as a way to make a livelihood are seen more widely. In its most extreme we will see entire countries becoming inaccessible for humanitarian aid workers.

International Organisations and European Union

Global (ideology-driven) terrorism and international criminal activity start to overlap, particularly in countries where the rule of law is absent or seriously failing. This will lead to selective withdrawal from international cooperation and increasing barriers, primarily affecting the economically weak.

Think Tanks

A major concern here is the piracy off the Horn of Africa which is seriously disrupting shipping and driving up costs which could have an increasingly strong impact on the global economy.

CAPACITY-BUILDING TO FIGHT STATE FAILURE

A representative from the industry formulated a core dilemma facing states and organisations wanting to address the issue of state failure. It concerned the unwillingness of the international community to change international borders at times impeding the successful resolution of the failure of the state:



Do we want to recreate the same state which is likely to break up along similar lines? Or do we want to rethink some of the ex-colonial states and break them into smaller more ethnically convergent states?



Short of rearranging the global map, the ideas for solving the crisis presented by failed states ranged from a traditional-realist approach to grass-roots idealism. To some, dealing with failed states meant stabilising the country. A military officer suggested pooling all the efforts being undertaken to address stability concerns in states and to stimulate good governance. In these states there is a:



Lack of personnel and equipment” and “therefore there is a definite need to pool all efforts within the member states.



A national policy planner believed that helping these states required:

“

Support [to] these countries in the field of education, the new young generation should be seen as the first stability, we have to help to build new state structures and effective government agencies, investment and new job opportunities.

”

A respondent from the community of international organisations and a national policy planner advanced a role for NATO to train and support the armed forces of third states. This suggestion was specifically made with respect to African crisis management capabilities.

According to an NGO representative, in addressing the “*root causes of socio-economic/security/climate change induced migration*” from weak states, NATO could contribute through “*effective capacity-building ... of southern border countries’ security and policy establishment*”.

Capacity-building and “*ensuring [that] states can manage their own security*” was held to be a key solution to dealing with state failure since, as a representative from the industry noted “*occupation is not a long-term solution*”. A participant in the think tank community agreed, writing that robust early engagement was necessary in these states, along with a comprehensive approach, to be quickly followed by “*switching responsibility to the locals*”. As a think tank expert said:

“

[NATO] needs to understand that it is there to provide a secure environment and economic growth and stability is the responsibility of others.

”

For NATO, building capacity in these states could imply strengthening the military and law enforcement capabilities, providing:

“

Intelligence and detection systems to give warning and open information exchange to ensure there is a correct picture. ... NATO is a coalition organisation that can help states manage their own security by training, providing forces on the ground for a limited period.

”

However, this requires NATO to become embedded in a broader international framework, playing a role in:



A larger integrated approach of problems, legitimised by a global governance structure, presumably the UN [Security Council].



As mentioned above, a key security trend associated with the shift in the international system and connected to state failure is the rise of non-state actors and the strategic importance of terrorism.

TERRORISM AND NON-STATE ACTORS

Since the events of September 11, 2001 many NATO member states have had to cope with terrorist strikes in their countries, against their populations or their interests. In addition, the threat of terrorism is closely related to state failure and poor governance, since the structural weaknesses of states create the conditions where terrorist groups and other non-state actors can thrive or find a safe haven.²³ A situation has evolved where, as a military officer stated: *“the ability of the Westphalian ‘state’ to control/monopolise violence has steadily eroded”* in favour of non-state actors. Furthermore, as elaborated on by the National Intelligence Council, the threat of terrorism and non-state actors is closely related to the proliferation of increasingly lethal technologies.²⁴

In general, the strategic impact of the non-state actors has increased. They not only pose a military challenge through asymmetric operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, but they are increasingly threatening the well-being of the global economy. Using the example provided by a NATO official:



World trade is done mostly by sea and any attempt to hamper it by violent means (Somali piracy might just be sea training experiences or attempts to get the skills to conduct other type of terrorist ops at sea) might be of great prejudice to the economy of some countries in particularly and to the world economy in general.



23) Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, *Terrorist Black Holes: A study into terrorist sanctuaries and governmental weaknesses* (The Hague: TNO Defence, Security and Safety - Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005).

24) National Intelligence Council (U.S.), *Global trends 2025: A Transformed World*, p. ix.

RELEVANT QUOTES

NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM

National Military

The regional and global security threats and political influences generated by terrorist groups around the globe. These groups have been energised and empowered by the actions and successes of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. This multitude of loosely connected and oftentimes separate terrorist groups will continue to pose the most important security issue in the coming 5-10 years through not only their violent attacks, but also by their mere existence.

National Policy Planners

The fight against terrorism is the most important security issue, including both the activities of terrorists and the response to this threat. The most important question is how to find the best means (to use force or to facilitate dialogue) to deal with terrorism in order to diminish it and not to make situation worse. For example, one of the most pressing questions could be: are representatives of states going to engage in negotiations with 'terrorists' if this kind of action improves the security in a situation?

NATO

Terrorist groupings, using assymetric 'warfare', having no 'home state' and hitting with whatever means they can get at. So WMD and technology are means that we can expect to be used in the very near future by AQ-like minded terrorist groups. The extra danger to AQ minded groupings is that they are based on Osama bin Laden's ideology like the whole world should become Islamic (the resurrection of the Caliphate). Since we have a lot of difference between the 'rich and the poor' we will see that the clash of civilisations/ideologies/religions fuelled by ObL's and TB 'preachers' must be considered also as a very realistic security risk.

Students	I think that especially in Asia there are many terrorist attacks yet to come. Especially in countries like India, Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Industry	Terrorism and asymmetrical threats. This has different implications, for example: how to confront terrorist organisations in places like Afghanistan? What capabilities (in the broad sense, not just military) are needed? How to address the root causes of terrorism? How to deal with home-grown terrorists?
International Organisations & EU	Progress will be much easier if states that are unable or unwilling to cooperate no longer have the Arab-Israeli conflict to hide behind. Current anti-terrorist policies largely focus on prevention, rather than a sensible response to fundamentalist ideologies. We need to drop this endless repetition of the word 'democracy'. It is insufficient basis for debate ...
Think Tanks	Growth in the power of non-state actors such as terrorist groups and organized, transnational crime networks.

Non-state actors not only include terrorist groups, they are also local militant groups such as the Taliban, pirates including those off the coast of West Africa or in the Gulf of Aden, and organised crime syndicates involved in drug trafficking or smuggling. Yet all non-state actors pose a unique set of operational challenges, as many NATO militaries have experienced during operations in Afghanistan, East Africa or the Caribbean. Particularly among military officers the concern over non-state actors was prevalent, possibly resulting from operational experiences with non-state actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, Congo or the Gulf of Aden.

By far the majority of comments about non-state actors referred to terrorist organisations, only a few referred to international organised crime syndicates. Among the exceptions is one expert in the think tank community, who acknowledged the importance of addressing:



Global criminality and [its] links to local networks (drugs, human trafficking, arms trafficking, illegal exploitation of resources).



In addition, there was one military officer who identified multinational corporations as non-state actors with increasing influence in global politics:

“ *[T]ransnational companies will be profiting of growing world globalisation and will influence decision-making processes in international security issues.* ”

Many concerns related to terrorist groups gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. These interactions have already been elaborated on above.

The rise of non-state actors in international security has produced a volatile cocktail. A think tank expert said that since 9/11:

“ *The world is in ... a golden age for terrorist groups and organised transnational crime networks.* ”

Another think tank expert described the present situation as follows:

“ *The [central challenge is] proliferation of non-state actors which often is a by-product of failed, failing and weak states. Piracy off Somalia, Al Qaeda, Taliban, drug traffickers, rebel factions all create great havoc where they are uncontrolled by states and cannot be held to account by international organisations. Sanctions that can be applied to states with the expectation of success, cannot be applied to non-state actors. This makes it very difficult to deal with them, and the global situation continues to get worse.* ”

Key concerns vis-à-vis terrorist groups are that they are difficult to track down. They often seek sanctuary in weak states, where transparency is limited. Also, terrorist groups attack in a host of ways which continue to surprise law enforcement. A national policy planner warned for the challenges posed by:

“ *[The] creation of a state within a traditional state (e.g. Pakistan/tribal areas and Somalia) [and the] development of unprecedented and 'new' forms of terrorism like 9/11 and Mumbai.* ”

A military officer said:



This multitude of loosely connected and oftentimes separate terrorist groups will continue to pose the most important security issue in the coming 5-10 years through not only their violent attacks, but also by their mere existence.



DEALING WITH TERRORISM

Among the respondents there seemed to be a general consensus to promote a broader, and somewhat softer approach to deal with terrorism than we have seen over the past seven years. As a clear indicator, respondents denounced the concept of the 'war on terrorism'.

The responses to terrorism were driven by a series of strategic questions: how to remove a terrorist sanctuary, how to avoid people from becoming terrorists, and how to protect society against terrorism? As a representative from the industry said, the main questions are:



How to confront terrorist organisations in places like Afghanistan? What capabilities (in the broad sense, not just military) are needed? How to address the root causes of terrorism? How to deal with home-grown terrorists?



Other questions were voiced by a national policy planner:



How to find the best means (to use force or to facilitate dialogue) to deal with terrorism in order to diminish it and not to make the situation worse? For example, one of the most pressing questions could be: are representatives of states going to engage in negotiations with 'terrorists' if this kind of action improves the security in a situation?



This last question is all the more topical, as it produced headlines in early 2009, when the suggestion was made to 'talk' to the Taliban for the sake of improving the situation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the expectation was that these questions will remain unanswered for several years as the 'global age of non-state actors' persists.

A NATO official said that dealing with terrorism required a paradigm shift:

“

We have to approach those groupings and talk to them, try to understand their reasoning and try to see how we could take away part of their discontent and how to give them some prosperity too. We (Western people) probably have to adapt our way of living a bit as well and not expect that every nation/ grouping of people think the same way as we do. Not try to impose our way of thinking, living, etc.

”

Better intelligence-sharing among the various international agencies and defusing the anti-Muslim movement in the West was an idea promoted by a military officer. In that regard, an EU official promoted strategic communications with Arab and Islamic countries. The official said:

“

The main terrorism target countries could arrange a meeting with Islamic countries to discuss how to effectively but constructively counter terrorist ideologies. Without a credible good faith response, which can be underwritten by moderate Islam believers, anti-terrorism [policies] will continue to breed terrorists. We need to ideologically isolate the terrorists. Such an approach will only be effective if the Arab-Israeli conflict can no longer be put forth – in good faith or bad – as an obstacle.

”

The official also promoted a greater role for the European Union:

“

In defining and carrying the ‘ideological’ part of the effort ... including designing a joint EU response, engaging its counterparts in an ‘ideological’ dialogue, and providing funding and policy development resources.

”

In the realm of strategic communications, a think tank expert suggested a broad-based media campaign, which would:

“

Make it clear to illegal drug users in Western countries that by buying heroin they are financing the war of the Taliban and Al Qaeda against their own countries [...]

”

A second element put forward was that the international community should put greater collective effort into avoiding the creation of terrorist sanctuaries and making terrorist membership unattractive. A think tank expert said:

“

Strengthen failed, failing and weak states to help them eventually control the non-state entities, and provide alternative employment for lower ranks involved in these activities.

”

ROOT CAUSES

A common focus was on the socio-economic basis for terrorism, the so-called ‘root causes’. A strong sentiment was prevalent that people could be motivated away from terrorism if their economic prospects improved. A student said it is not necessary to attack terrorism directly, but to cut off the terrorist’s:

“

Need to exist. Let terrorist organisations run dry. ... The developed world should do all it can to make sure the new generation of kids get proper education in a stable environment.

”

Also, a representative from the industry noted:

“

[Achieve] economic growth to dissuade people from signing on as terrorists – including aid and trade support. Ensure significant job growth in developing nations, where some 50% of the population will enter the workforce over the next 15 years.

”

A national policy planner said:

“

Address as a priority the root causes of terrorism as well as the short and medium threat of terrorist attacks. Make sure the latter does not interfere with the first. Move away from the Global War on Terrorism Concept (you are either with or against us) and contain the problem as much as possible within the boundaries of faraway places. Make sure International Law prevails also in the fight against terrorists.

”

A further aspect of dealing with the root causes of terrorism was to put renewed effort in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An EU official commented:

“

Progress will be much easier if states that are unable or unwilling to cooperate no longer have the Arab-Israeli conflict to hide behind. Current anti-terrorist policies largely focus on prevention, rather than a sensible response to fundamentalist ideologies. We need to drop this endless repetition of the word ‘democracy’. It is an insufficient basis for debate.

”

There was substantial support for a collective, multilateral approach to terrorism among the participants. As is made clear by the following quotes, across the different communities a comprehensive international approach was put forward.

Military Officer A:

“

[To deal with terrorism in Afghanistan] the US, NATO, UN, and Afghanistan neighbours must commit to a clearly defined infrastructure development programme in Afghanistan ...

”

Military Officer B:

“

Coordination between United Nations, NATO, African Union, European Union. UN has to have leading role ... cutting financial resources, development of intelligence structures, coordination between international organisations and governments and NGOS ...

”

Military Officer C:

“

Nation-states, intergovernmental organisations, and non-governmental organisations must focus on developing and improving enhanced networking of global security initiatives and anti-terrorism activities.

”

Representative from the industry:

“ Focus increasingly on a comprehensive approach involving all the relevant actors and international organisations and develop better coordination between the military, political and development tools that can be deployed in a given situation. Increasing focus on the root causes of terrorism. ”

Think tank expert:

“ NATO would have to place its operations firmly within a larger integrated approach of problems, legitimised by a global governance structure presumably the UNSC ... ”

There was, however, also some support for a tougher approach. A representative of the industry said that dealing with terrorism meant using military means, while at the same time working through the Security Council:

“ [Deploy] military strikes against the said non-state actors, and use the Security Council as a means to combat the issue rather than looking at it as a road block which would entail using the veto power of the permanent members judiciously. ”

Also, when asked what capabilities are required to deal with terrorism, a think tank expert said that piracy could be reduced by:

“ Requiring ships to have guards in the same way that banks are required to use security measures when they transfer money. ”

NATO'S ROLE IN TERRORISM

A comprehensive approach to deal with terrorist non-state actors was seen by the respondents as a core necessity. Not only to deal with complex emergencies, but also to manage the broad range of challenges. One NATO official said that dealing with terrorism requires dealing with failed states as well, and that this requires a strategy based on implementing a comprehensive approach:



Security strategies (national and international) still put too much focus on just one dimension, and mostly also too much on end effects. They must become more comprehensive (interagency) and more focused on the root causes. Example: we can go on with maritime counter-piracy operations for ages, if we do not at the same time try to solve the problem that pirates have safe havens at land. It is not wrong to do counter-piracy operations, but we must in a comprehensive approach solve the cause of the problem as well.



And as part of such a broader approach, a stability role for the Alliance was promoted. A think tank expert said:



NATO can play a major role in [the] defence against terrorism. Within a political stability role NATO could contribute to stability and security. Sharing of intelligence and combating of terrorist threats is a real option for NATO.



To do so, a military officer said NATO “*must develop a formal counter-terrorism directorate*”. This could operate along with, as a representative from the industry said, a strengthened:



Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work aimed at equipping the nations’ armed forces with the appropriate technologies to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists.



DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Another series of challenges to Western states identified by the respondents related to demographic issues. The most important demographic trend in the years to come is the unequal distribution of global population growth. By 2050 the world will count 9.1 billion inhabitants, 7.9 billion of which will originate from developing countries. Connected to this are aging populations in the West, and the likelihood of large immigration flows. Youth bulges will increasingly pressure governments to provide sufficient economic opportunities. This is particularly the case in the Middle East and North Africa, where people under 24 years of age currently make up half the population, and Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the fastest growing region. The lack of opportunity, education and

employment caused by state failure can lead to increased instability, and migratory movements. Western countries, faced with these demographic trends, will need to address immigration and its related concerns.

The challenges referred to by the participants were the instability created by youth bulges or increasing populations in developing states on the one hand, and the difficulty of Western states to cope with immigration and the cultural tensions that accompany it, on the other hand. The first aspect corresponds to the challenge of state failure and poor governance, while the second has substantial domestic implications. These two series of challenges are interrelated. An increased instability caused by population growth may lead to immigration to Western states.

At the system level, aging populations in the rich West and youth bulges in developing countries increase global tensions. According to a think tank expert:

“

Some countries have difficulty coping with a youth bulge, with huge numbers of disaffected and unemployed youth creating security issues, while other countries have a falling birthrate, and have difficulty coping with the problems of a graying society. The disparity between countries is a problem in itself ...

”

As a result, according to a think tank expert, this leads to a risk of increased tensions in the West:

“

Population migration as poorer people migrate to richer nations [is a challenge]. This could cause significant tensions and a breakdown of society even in well-developed countries.

”

Regarding the second set of challenges affecting Western societies directly there was substantial concern among the participants that immigration had a negative impact on Western security. A NATO official said that:

“

The changing societal make-up of populations of member nations will bring about [changes] in the shared values and policy positions of nations. Aging populations and the lack of integration of immigrants will allow minority groups to grow more powerful politically.

”

RELEVANT QUOTES

DEMOGRAPHICS

National Military

The European population is decreasing and that is affecting Europe's overall strategies, will of self-defence, etc. China is facing the problem of having large numbers of old people and having no one to take care of them.

NATO

Demographics – the changing societal make-up of populations of member nations will bring about changing in the shared values and policy positions of nations. Aging populations and the lack of integration of immigrants will allow minority groups to grow more powerful politically.

National Policy Planners

Disproportions between income of rich and poor as well as 'demographic pressure' from third world countries.

Industry

Population migration as poorer people migrate to richer nations. This could cause significant tensions and a breakdown of society even in well-developed countries

NGO

Obstacles to the free flow of people: fortress mentalities in the wealthy/stable states, unmanageable movements of people for socio-economic, security or climate-change reasons. The collective failure of the international community to deal with the issue fairly. As a collateral development many more places become off-limits for outsiders due to general insecurity and 'revenge attacks' on representatives of the wealthy states (whether this identification is fair or not).

International Organisations & EU

Changing demographics within Alliance nations.

Think tanks

Population stress arising from differences in the population growth rates between rich and poor societies, illegal immigration, migration that dilutes societal identity, and from spiralling growth of megacities in poor countries.

Students

Regional instability and mass migration. Fragile states will increasingly be unable and/or unwilling to provide basic security to its citizens and will fail to prevent crises. Spill-over effects will stimulate large-scale crises that NATO will see itself confronted with.

This statement reflected concerns over weakened solidarity as the make-up of Western states changes. According to one military officer a key challenge was:



The cultural integration of the Muslim world in European states. The number of Muslims in Europe is intensively growing while the number of 'original' European people is decreasing. This fact creates a certain demand for managing the integration of Muslim values into Western societies.



Another NATO official signaled a similar trend, but concluded that this could result in domestic instability in the West. He said a key concern was:



Whitepest, i.e. the decrease of white and Christian populations, mainly in Europe, the rise in numbers of immigrants, mostly non-Christians, which will not adhere to Western values, initially closing themselves in ghettos, later on emerging from there giving origin to urban conflicts that might be led and coordinated by foreign terrorist organisations.



A national policy planner went one step further saying a major challenge was that:



Population migrates from poor countries to the rich, partially destroying them.



SOLUTIONS TO DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUES

The proposed solutions to these demographic concerns focused on improving the situation in developing countries in order to decrease immigration flows, strengthening anti-immigration policies or working on the cultural integration of existing minority groups in the West. Regarding the latter, improved cultural understanding and protection of Western values would benefit security. A military officer said:

“

There is a need for a continued dialogue within the societies of Europe about the integration of Muslims. Europeans should also accept that societies can change and adjust. Nevertheless it is important to draw a clear line: fundamental human rights and the rule of law must not be diminished by sectarian approaches of (radical) Islamic law.

”

A NATO official commented that NATO could play a role through its partnership and outreach programmes to promote Western values among the main countries of origin of migrants:

“

Fuel adherence of the youth to Western values. Create PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue-like fora to discuss equal opportunities and create a trust [of] values.

”

A similar solution, but more internally focused, was to improve domestic strategic communications targeting immigrants. As a NATO official stated:

“

Increase efforts to integrate immigrant populations in secular societies, develop strategic communications to inculcate societies with the shared values of the Alliance, increase the development of relationships with diaspora and use them to influence the policies of their ‘homelands’.

”

Furthermore, a far-reaching suggestion from another NATO official was to strengthen:

“

Public policies to increase birth rates through all Europe ...”, while developing “plans to facilitate the adherence to Western values by immigrants and their integration in society ...

”

Respondents put forward several ideas indicating how NATO could assist in stemming immigration and stabilising the affected countries. Various participants identified ways in which NATO could support stopping the flow of immigration through surveillance missions. A national policy planner said that:

“ *[NATO can] proactively ... provide more security and stability for the regions and countries if needed, retroactively ... stop illegal human trafficking and waves of refugees and immigrants into NATO countries.* ”

This view was echoed by the NATO official emphasising that NATO could:

“ *Improve the control of outer borders in order to prevent illegal immigration.* ”

When it came to the stabilisation of third countries, several options were developed. On the one hand, NATO can support governments to effectively police their borders. On the other hand, NATO could contribute to improving the living standards in these countries of origin to avoid migration, and:

“ *Address the root causes of socio-economic/security/climate change-induced migration.* ”

Various development aid-related solutions were promoted. As a national policy planner mentioned, policies, ranging from promoting trade to improving health care and education, could help:

“ *People should be motivated to improve their living standard, they should believe in a better future in the counties where they live, we have to open our market for the goods and products of developing countries, investment, health care should be sponsored by developed countries, educated people should stay in the country to take over responsibility for future development.* ”

Similarly, a think tank expert noted:



Reduce protectionism in rich, developed countries, and take all measures possible for economic development, education and training in countries with large youth populations.



Or, as a representative from the industry said:



Ensur[e] significant job growth in developing nations where some 50% of the population will enter the workforce over the next 15 years. Ensure that states can manage their own security – occupation is not a long-term solution.



CYBER-THREATS, CHANGES IN WARFARE AND ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY

As a final element under discussion, various participants indicated societal vulnerabilities and dependencies on critical infrastructure as key challenges for the coming years. This led to a set of challenges that emphasised societal resilience as a function of homeland security. It concerned vulnerabilities connected to the functioning of societies in relation to advances in technology. Mostly respondents from industry highlighted the importance of shifts in available technology and changes in warfare, perhaps as a result of their technology-based professions. The challenges identified concerned the functioning of society, varying from generic contemplations on vulnerabilities to societies, to interdependencies, to the formulation of precise threats such as cyber-security and space-based warfare.

THE ORDER OF SOCIETY AS A CHALLENGE

A first element mentioned in relation to societal vulnerabilities was at the same time the most abstract element, referring to the ordering principle inside Western societies. Many industrial sectors that operate critical infrastructure for society, like the energy, electricity or telecommunications sectors, are vulnerable to system level disruptions, amongst others as a result of working with decreasing operating margins to improve efficiency. The increased reliance on vulnerable but critical infrastructures with *“little spare capacity”* may lead to major societal upheavals.

A think tank expert captured this as follows:

“ *[A key challenge over the next 5 to 10 years is] socio-economic vulnerability resulting from business practices such as just-in-time delivery.* ”

One representative from the industry argued that such societal vulnerabilities were amplified due to competition in the globalised economy:

“ *Western societies, and increasingly those in emerging economies, are demanding ever more sophisticated services and solutions to support everyday existence. By definition, these in turn require unprecedented investment by governments and corporations. ... Whilst the cost to the consumer goes down, the resilience of the producer/service-provider is also reduced, for example, as an increasingly broad network of low-cost economies ... are relied upon to satisfy the appetites of the more sophisticated economies. Effectively, points of vulnerability now extend far beyond the ability of individual nation-states and regional alliances to protect.* ”

Not only reliance on the private sector, but also on third countries increases the vulnerability of the system, and raises concerns to develop resilience.

Furthermore, another representative from the industry argued that the reliance on the private sector has led not only to reduced societal resilience in developed economies, but had rather been reduced by the make-up of society itself. The fact that people in the West no longer rely on smaller family – or tribe-sized units for their provision of safety and prosperity, but rather turn to governments, means that Western societies are vulnerable to system disturbances. The respondent argued that in the West people are becoming disconnected from the fabric of society, and therefore are also vulnerable to the appearance of challenging ideologies. He observed that while Western states were perceived as being a global policeman, they were intrinsically vulnerable to deal with an increasingly unstable world:



Whereas developed economies are expected to bear the bulk of the burden of catering for global security and encouraging prosperity, they are the least resilient, especially when faced with global structural risk and risk associated with factors such as simplistic belief systems (such as religious fundamentalism). Thus, whilst remaining prepared to deal with risk further beyond their borders than ever before, Western nations particularly must have a very robust mechanism for dealing with societal (and thus crippling economic) fragmentation at home.



The comment illustrated how the three preceding trends related to societal vulnerability. It underlined the exposure of modern Western societies to the negative impact of migration and terrorism, which both are trends associated with state failure.

SOCIETAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

Contemplating these vulnerabilities led to a series of challenges derived from the exploitation of societal interdependencies. A representative from the industry held that as a result of interdependencies between the various functions of society, whether financial, political or economic, Western society had become susceptible to disturbances:



[The] global interlinking and increasing interdependence of political, business and economic activity facilitates targeting of pressure points beyond the geographical and operational reach of any physical defensive alliance.



Non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, are in a position to exploit these weak points. At the same time, states that wish to target Western societies need not do so militarily. As suggested above, Western countries are exposed to a series of composite threats, which can be economic, financial or military in nature. States may use the export of oil or natural gas as a political tool, while attacks by terrorist proxies on critical infrastructure can incapacitate a society. Also, large-scale dumping of foreign currency can bring the economy to near-collapse.

A NATO official similarly observed that the traditional notion of warfare had changed and that Western societies would likely be threatened in a variety of ways and that the combination of these threats formed the major challenge. He referred to a set of interrelated developments:

“

like energy security combined with the shortage of food and water (coming up in the very near future), use of technology in the wrong hands (cyberwarfare by terrorists putting our financial markets completely ‘lame’; usage of ‘dirty’ bombs, etc). Combine this with religious indoctrination of the weaker and poorer societies and we will have a difficult job to manage this.

”

All had to do with the functioning of Western societies. One of the areas that was a particular weak point, according to the respondents, was information technology, the internet and cyber-security.

CYBER-THREATS

Describing the threat posed by cyber-attacks, a military officer said that:

“

The openness of our society, information technology and networked communities are the source of our vulnerability and organised crime will profit from that.

”

Not only organised crime but also terrorist organisations could use information technologies to wreak havoc. A think tank expert said that a key challenge for the coming decade was the “*illegal use of cyberspace*” for criminal purposes, but also the threat of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure. This related to the threat of cyber-terrorism. One military officer said a key concern was:

“

the abuse of new technologies, especially cyberspace, by criminal non-state actors and transnational terrorist groups.

”

History has shown that not only non-state actors but even governments or groups closely connected to governments may resort to cyber-attacks as an instrument of coercion. A group closely linked with the Kremlin has been widely considered to be responsible for the Estonian cyber-crash in May 2007.²⁵

While Russian hackers were active during the Georgian-Russian War of August 2008, taking down Georgian and Azerbaijani websites, Georgian hackers were doing the same to Russian sites. This cyber-censorship is becoming an increasingly common element in information operations, but at the same time it is also less threatening than the cyber-attacks that incapacitated elements of Estonian society. This is the true concern. A military officer said that exploiting cyber-vulnerabilities could imply planting:

“

A computer virus in a megaport container distribution system; one at a time or several megaports attacked at the same time.

”

A key dilemma, as one military officer commented, is that “*internet [is] very dependent on goodwill to function smoothly*”. As a result, there is very little control.

A representative from industry complemented this exploration of vulnerabilities of information technologies:

“

As we become more and more reliant on the internet and networks, the issue of illegal entry to systems and the possibility for an attack will become more severe. In many ways the new form of warfare will be to bring down society by destroying or altering data so that society does not work properly. This effect does not need to be against a nation, but can be against an international system: financial is the most obvious, but also network control, international businesses, defence communications systems, satellite control, etc.

”

25) Marge Tubalkain-Trell, “Kremlin-backed group behind Estonia cyber-blitz”, Baltic Business News, 11 March 2009, <http://balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=b737410e-e519-4a36-885f-85b183cc3478>.

SOLUTIONS TO CYBER-THREATS

Dealing with cyber-threats required a mix of regulatory and control mechanisms. According to one military officer:

“ *A good solution might be the creation of a new and secure internet or anyhow secure cyberspace.* ”

Likewise, a representative from the industry argued to create:

“ *More security and identification on the net. [Develop] separate back-up systems [and detect] anomalies in behaviour. All to be balanced with the freedom of the individual.* ”

According to a national policy planner, NATO could play a role dealing with cyber-threats by:

“ *◇ [Building] contingency plans for supporting member nations in defending their critical infrastructure.*
◇ [Helping] build and support a viable Cyber Defense Research and Education Centre.
◇ [Building] contingency plans for getting Alliance forces quickly to the support of national forces in the event of terrorist or other more conventional attacks. ”

A think tank expert concurred:

“ *NATO could play a role in coordinating cybersecurity issues and providing support in case of cyber attacks.* ”

The respondent also said that NATO should expand its capabilities in this new arena of warfare since, “*for the future, a role in offensive cyber-measures is envisaged.*”

SPACE-BASED VULNERABILITIES

One other societal vulnerability was only mentioned by two participants. However, in view of its novelty and its relationship to system vulnerabilities it is worth mentioning here: space-based warfare. According to a student participant and a military officer space systems are vitally important to many of the logistics and communications activities in developed Western societies:



The US relies heavily on its space assets for its military capabilities. States like China will – in case of conflict – target these US space-based systems. To avoid negative effects of space war for global GPS-systems, global communications, etc. there should be many back-up satellites and other alternative systems. If not, space war will have catastrophic effects for global society.



For NATO this implies:



[Assuring] availability of back-up systems, and invest as much as possible in defensive space measures that cannot be used for offensive purposes, thereby protecting space assets and avoid triggering an arms race in space.



Concerning the range of strategic issues identified, the respondents put forward an ambitious agenda.

NATO faces a series of challenges for which it finds itself ill-prepared. The security trends point towards the necessity to redefine NATO's strategic orientation. The Alliance needs to develop expeditionary capabilities to deal with state failure, terrorism and the negative dimension of migration far away from home, while facing greater concern for societal resilience at home. The security trends discussed above lead to the following strategic dilemma for the Alliance:


STRATEGIC DILEMMA

KEY SECURITY TRENDS (STATE FAILURE, NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM, DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIETAL VULNERABILITIES) OFFER A POWERFUL IMPETUS TO CHANGE NATO'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION TOWARDS ABROAD EXPEDITIONARY ALLIANCE EMBEDDED IN INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES AND ADDRESS SOCIETAL RESILIENCE, BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE ALLIANCE CAN LIVE UP TO THIS AMBITIOUS AGENDA.


CHALLENGES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE

SECURITY ISSUES BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

CHALLENGES WITHIN THE
TRANSATLANTIC
ALLIANCE




MILITARY-OPERATIONAL
CHALLENGES



SECURITY ISSUES AND LOCATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

AFGHANISTAN



Solidarity



The [key] challenges are the fundamental perceptual differences amongst NATO member states in what they see as the purpose of any alliance.



-Industry Representative in *New Horizons*

When addressing the future of the Alliance, it will not suffice to look at outside challenges only. As a number reports over the past years have indicated, arguably the most important defining feature for the future of the Alliance is the ability of its member states to address internal concerns, both within the organisation and between Europe and the United States.²⁶ In the following chapter we will look at the challenges that were identified by the participants. They related to the internal workings of the Transatlantic Alliance, the concept of solidarity, the Alliance's cooperation with European partner organisations, as well as the military challenges encountered by NATO forces in operations.

²⁶⁾ See for instance Hamilton et al., *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21 st Century*, and S. De Spiegeleire and A.R. Korteweg, "Future NATOs", *NATO Review*, Summer 2006.

DEALING WITH A LACK OF SOLIDARITY

The challenges within the Transatlantic Alliance range from generic concerns over the concept of solidarity to specific frustrations regarding the execution of Alliance operations. Most of the internal challenges were connected with institutional failure or with military-operational challenges. Of central concern is the lack of consensus and a breakdown of solidarity among the members of the Alliance. A representative from the industry commented:

“

The major security issue the transatlantic community is facing is its own lack of credibility which has its roots in its lack of consensus and lack of will.

”

Another participant from the industry concurred, adding that the Alliance was witnessing some of the tell-tale signs of strategic complacency:

“

The challenge is the fundamental perceptual differences amongst NATO member states in what they see as the purpose of any alliance. Post [World War II], the need for a traditional defensive alliance was clear ... today less so. Much is lost in the socio-economic, political and cultural ‘clutter’ that inevitably takes over after a long period of peace. What actually is the threat or overriding need that will galvanise states into membership of an alliance?

”

The respondent alluded to the breakdown of solidarity absent a common threat, or strategic orientation. Another representative from the industry responded with optimism that:

“

When a real threat arrives this will be resolved very fast. Nations will come together.

”

Nevertheless, there was agreement that solidarity in the Alliance was showing cracks.

One aspect of the lack of solidarity is what respondents believed was an apparent hollow commitment from allied heads of state. Political support for a mission without supplying the necessary resources to achieve success creates frustrations. It carries

the risk of operational failure, and impacts the credibility of the Alliance, which in itself is a strategic risk.

A representative from the industry highlighted that in the field of military operations, this reduced ability to generate enough forces had led to an increasing reliance on outsourcing and contracting, which although perhaps cost-effective, could not foster the necessary strategic commitment of a nation and its resources to pursue a large complex operation to its successful completion.

Another representative from the industry identified a slippery slope if a dichotomy between solidarity and political-military commitments existed:

“ Governments are making political commitments at head of state level and not providing the resources to execute [the operation]. This means we are staring failure in the face. This means a lack of credibility. This means an increased risk of more insurgency and so we escalate further and further. ”

The solution, said the respondent, was to “*put your money where your mouth is!*” – the primary dilemma being the communication between politicians and their electorates.

A further element of Alliance de-solidarisation regarded decisions on the use of force. When could allies agree? As was made clear by the crisis over the Iraq War, the concept of pre-emptive warfare had not been accepted by all NATO member states. A national policy planner said that the key issue under consideration was:

“ The [internal] discussion on the use of force and the application of the concept of self-defence. ”

He mentioned it included elements regarding the interpretation of “*traditional and asymmetric threats (such as cyber-defence)*”. This concerned how these threats were interpreted in the light of NATO’s Article V because, as he said:

“ Confidence in Article 5 and common threat perceptions are the two most important issues in transatlantic cooperation, that has been the cornerstone of peace and stability in Europe for last decades. ”

RELEVANT QUOTES

CHALLENGES WITHIN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

National Military	Failing cooperation among democratic states, erosion of common interest due to the selfish promotion of national interests in critical situations.
NATO	Lack of political focus and willingness to deal with Global and International Security Issues in NATO Alliance Nations and EU: it is demonstrated by – the lack of (responsible) interest (and proper awareness) by the (national) populations of the EU Alliance Member Countries to NATO, in International and Global Security Issues: the impact and consequences of this are huge. [A further challenge is] the ‘political’ competition between EU and NATO when trying to position themselves in a global picture: this creates a confusing and distracting atmosphere with very negative effect.
National Policy Planners	The [main challenge is the] discussion on the use of force and the application of the concept of self-defence, including dealing with traditional and asymmetric threats (such as cyber-defence). This relates also to NATO’s Article 5. Confidence in Article 5 and common threat perception are two most important issues in transatlantic cooperation that has been the cornerstone of peace and stability in Europe for last decades.
Industry	The major security issue the transatlantic community is facing is its own lack of credibility which has its roots in its lack of consensus and lack of will.
Think Tanks	[The key challenge is the] lack of patience, both in the conduct of operations as well as with regard to the time needed to achieve common political goals in general.

Students

A failing ISAF mission. The Alliance will be increasingly self-absorbed having to deal with its own failure in Afghanistan. Identity crisis and decline in public and political support.

There was a hint of defeatism among the participants when it came to discussing NATO's internal problems. Here is a discussion as it ensued within the think tank community. Its subject is the ability of NATO to remain a cohesive alliance:

Expert A:

“

[The key challenge is the] ability of NATO to continue to function as an effective security organisation.

”

Expert B:

“

Internal divisions over commitment to Afghanistan and enlargement are weakening NATO, yet there does not appear to be an effective alternative.

”

Expert C:

“

Lack of patience, both in the conduct of operations as well as with regard to the time needed to achieve common political goals in general.

”

Expert D:

“

Add the lack of success, counter-insurgency operations are not easy. Moreover, state-building (bringing democracy, etc.) is likely to fail.

”

A European Union official was somewhat gloomy over the prospects for the Alliance, saying that people should:

“

Accept that NATO will play [a] less prominent role in global security affairs, as power and legitimacy shifts away from the West.

”

Internal divisions, a lack of patience, and a lack of success during ongoing operations were all seen to eat away at the solidarity within the Alliance. An expert in the think tank community elaborated on all three, when discussing his interpretation of the key challenge facing the Alliance:

“

[The main concern is the] weakening of Western political and strategic cohesion, which allows many of the other global problems to get worse. For example, if all the NATO member countries from the beginning had contributed proportionately to the effort in Afghanistan with both active military and development resources, the country would be in much better shape, and the problems in northern Pakistan might not have become as serious as they are. The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and criminal warlords interpret this lack of cohesion as weakness in the Western character and are emboldened by it. Similarly, if countries like Germany and France acted more resolute vis-à-vis Russia, we might not have the annual pipeline circus in Ukraine. Russia again, might be less bold than it has been recently.

”

The think tank expert mentioned that with coherent US-European policies many problems would be alleviated. In other words, the fundamentals of the Alliance were at stake. Formulating requirements of an Alliance, a representative from the industry said:

“

Any alliance is expected to maintain an increasingly sophisticated expeditionary (political, economic and military) outlook and capability.

”

This essentially implied a degree of burden-sharing and solidarity. Instead, according to the respondent, within NATO there was a:



National tendency ... to push for ‘someone else’ to shoulder the bulk of the burden”. This was particularly identified with regards to the operation in Afghanistan.



AFGHANISTAN

The operation in Afghanistan is a key challenge for the Alliance, but it is plagued by a number of weaknesses. NATO member states are divided on how to bring stability to the country and how to fight an effective counter-insurgency. The cooperation is strained due to intelligence failures, less than effective strategic communications and a lack of intelligence-sharing.²⁷ At the military level, force generation is difficult and national caveats hamper the NATO commander’s flexibility. But at the political level, the mission in Afghanistan demonstrates how difficult it is for the Alliance to successfully pursue a complex emergency, and to deal with the challenges of the current security environment.

Burden-sharing in military operations is a necessary element of Alliance solidarity. However, in several Alliance operations this solidarity has been found wanting. A think tank expert commented that the operation in Afghanistan was decreasing Alliance solidarity:



Internal divisions over commitments to Afghanistan and enlargement are weakening NATO, yet there does not appear to be an effective alternative.



ANATO official, who was interviewed for this project, said that the operation in Afghanistan had brought all the differences between member states to the surface. He referred to the discussion over national caveats as well as the difficulties of force generation and the failure of certain member states to transform their forces to an expeditionary capability able to support the Alliance in a show of solidarity.

Across all participants, Afghanistan was mostly connected to *“military-operational challenges”*, but also to the development of a *“comprehensive approach”* and finally to *“Pakistan”*.

²⁷⁾ See also Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Glayton, *Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan: Fourth in a series of Joint Urban Operations and Counterinsurgency Studies*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, November 2008.

RELEVANT QUOTES

CHALLENGES WITHIN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

National Military

The third most important security issue in the coming 5-10 years is Afghanistan. This severely dilapidated, war-torn nation must be stabilised and brought under control by an indigenous national government and a regional cooperative effort. Intimately connected to the solution of this issue is the need to resolve the Kashmir issue and other tensions between Pakistan and India, as well as the influences of Iran and Russia. NATO and the US must succeed in Afghanistan through a regional diplomatic approach addressing common interests for the stabilisation and infrastructure development of Afghanistan.

NATO

The International Community failing to solve the problems in Afghanistan. This is a key to security for the coming years. If we do not succeed in one way or the other to put Afghanistan back into the 'normal operating states' (which does not necessarily mean operating like Western-oriented states) we will see the Taliban and AQ like terrorist groupings win terrain (again) and we will see a country reversing back into a direction that was one of the reasons that US had to attack in 2001 (right or wrong, but they did). This effort, which once again is a responsibility of the international community in total (so not only NATO's responsibility) needs to get more attention and effort than it has today. If we fail we will see again big safe havens for terrorist groupings and religion-oriented groupings using any means to make their case. This leads to the second most important security challenge, although it is closely interlinked with this one.

National Policy Planners	Getting Afghanistan right, while helping to keep Pakistan from failing.
Industry	Afghanistan as a failed state matters little more to NATO than as a semi-functioning one (all that is likely) in practical terms, other than providing another (there are plenty) place for the terrorist to train more easily. Continued engagement by NATO in Afghanistan is effectively adding to a perception of its impotence; this fundamentally undermines NATO's primary asset ... its function as an effective deterrent. ... Moral: if you have any alliance, don't take on any action you can't win convincingly, both on and (most importantly) off the battlefield and most certainly don't get drawn into one you don't understand (i.e. Afghanistan).
NGO	Middle East (Israel-Palestine conflict and India-Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan situation)
Think Tanks	This is not only because of the region's energy resources that are relevant for Russia, Europe and China. Central Asia also as a very important transport corridor – literally speaking – and with regard to energy supplies. So far China has been watching developments in Afghanistan from a distance. However, if the situation deteriorates significantly we are most likely to see a more active Chinese engagement because the stability of Afghanistan is important for different pipeline projects that run from Iran via Pakistan and Afghanistan to China.
Students	The USA and other countries currently in Iraq should leave Iraq. It is now obvious that Iraq is no terrorist treat. They should focus on finding the heads of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and stop them. So the mission in Afghanistan should probably continue. And there should be put more effort in trying to find the chiefs of these organisations.

Concerns over the mission in Afghanistan focused on operational difficulties to defeat the Taliban. In fact, throughout the period in which the New Horizons consultations proceeded, reports suggested that the United Nations and NATO were losing their grip on Afghanistan, and that the country was witnessing a return of the Taliban.²⁸

While the emphasis on Afghanistan appears to reflect a strong sense of presentism and concerns over current operations in Afghanistan make headlines today, the country may still present the international community with a substantial challenge five years on. As the National Intelligence Council assesses with respect to 2025:



*Centrifugal forces [pulling at the country] are likely to remain strong.*²⁹



Now that the focus of the new US administration has shifted towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, and with NATO member states leveraged in the ISAF operation, it was to be expected that the country would figure prominently in the consultations. As alluded to above, Afghanistan was the country most often referred to within the NATO community.

Of strategic concern was a possible failure to stabilise Afghanistan, empowering the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while the West suffers a strategic setback. Discussing possible Western failure in the country, there was discord over the likely implications of state failure in Afghanistan. Some participants believed that Afghanistan could be a failed state without strengthening the Taliban or Al Qaeda, while others dismissed that possibility. Instead, they believed, NATO's failure in Afghanistan would act as a magnet to these two organisations and strengthen their international appeal as well.

A NATO official voiced his concern over the impact on the broader international security dynamic, if NATO were to fail in Afghanistan. The respondent expected a revitalised international terrorist movement:



The [key challenge is] the international community failing to solve the problems in Afghanistan. This is a key to security for the coming years. If we do not succeed in one way or the other to put Afghanistan back into the 'normal operating states' (which does not necessarily mean operating like

28) International Council on Security and Development., *Struggle for Kabul the Taliban advance*. (London:MF Publishing., 2008)

29) National Intelligence Council (U.S.), *Global trends 2025: A Transformed World* p. 72.

Western-oriented states) we will see the Taliban and Al Qaeda-like terrorist groupings win terrain (again) and we will see a country reversing back into a direction that was one of the reasons that US had to attack in 2001 (right or wrong, but they did). This effort, which once again is a responsibility of the international community in total (so not only NATO's responsibility) needs to get more attention and effort than it has today. If we fail we will see again big safe havens for terrorist groupings and religion-oriented groupings using any means to make their case.

Another think tank participant seemed to disagree:

“ Afghanistan as a failed state matters little more to NATO than as a semi-functioning one.”

SOLUTIONS

With some of the participants the adverse situation in Afghanistan produced a defeatist attitude. Seeing a failure in Afghanistan as inevitable, a student predicted that it would make the Alliance:

“ Increasingly self-absorbed, having to deal with its own failure in Afghanistan. Identity crisis and decline in public and political support [will ensue]. ”

Similarly, a representative from the industry cynically said:

“ Continued engagement by NATO in Afghanistan [means] effectively adding to a perception of its impotence, this fundamentally undermines NATO's primary asset ... its function as an effective deterrent. ... Moral: if you have an Alliance, don't take on any action you can't win convincingly both on and (most importantly) off the battlefield ... and most certainly don't get drawn into [a conflict] you don't understand. ”

Others were less pessimistic, although they did express apprehension over the feasibility of the necessary steps to be taken. A NATO official addressed the need for greater cooperation among different organisations and states to provide non-military services:



Afghanistan ... still can become a success, though more has to be invested in development, police, judicial system, and good governance in general. If the US, NATO, UN and other players will not find a way in which to solve this problem in a comprehensive way, the region including surrounding nations can become a source of trouble in the future with escalating effects between cultures even within Western nations.



The comment resonated various aspects addressed in the Atlantic Council's Strategy Paper on the situation in Afghanistan in early 2008.³⁰ This document promoted a regional solution to the conflict, based on a critical reassessment of the situation on the ground. It also referred to the “*disorganised, uncoordinated and, at present, insufficient*” coordination between international organisations or national contributions to the efforts in Afghanistan.

A think tank expert believed that within the Alliance an open discussion on the operational necessities in Afghanistan was lacking:



NATO has to play a key role in Afghanistan. It must encourage its members to do more to provide security. There should be more open political discussions, so that issues can be talked through without fear that the Alliance will be weakened by such discussions, and that ultimately consensus can be reached on some of the tougher issues. Since most of the members of NATO are also members of the EU, they should be encouraged to make Afghan reconstruction and development a key EU issue, so that the two organisations can play strong complementary roles in Afghanistan.



30) Strategic Advisors Group, “Saving Afghanistan: An Appeal and Plan for Urgent Action”, Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, March 2008.

Addressing the solidarity crisis within the Alliance, a think tank expert said, required:

“

More emphasis in NATO discussions on the obligations of membership, the need to act strongly, and more effort needs to be made to publicise the benefits of NATO in the member countries.

”

The predominant practical concern was the traditional complaint of ensuring burden-sharing in the Alliance. As US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, had commented in early 2008:

“

*In NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other allies to bear a disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying.*³¹

”

This was resonated solidly by a think tank expert:

“

Some NATO members should contribute more troops with less caveats to support the Dutch, Canadian, and American troops to do a surge in the volatile areas of Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban, and hold the territory, to be followed immediately by more development assistance that focuses on capacity and infrastructure building, and local development.

”

A BROADER REGIONAL APPROACH

More importantly, a national policy planner said NATO needed to avoid half-measures and to take a broader regional approach:

“

NATO needs to pull out of Afghanistan, or go in heavy with more troops, though that has not always been the solution in Afghanistan [think of Russia in the eighties]. The problem is, and always has been Pakistan, which needs to sort out

31) Robert M. Gates, Remarks at the Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1214>.

its own intelligence agency (pressure from US could help, though sovereign states can be so prickly when it comes to their intelligence agencies). More troops, or pull out completely. There is no half-stepping in that region, and not much to gain in terms of natural resources and what not.

The situation in Pakistan was believed to pose a risk to achieving success in Afghanistan. One think tank expert said that:

Even without a total collapse, Al Qaeda in Pakistan is a serious security concern, having a tremendous negative impact on progress in Afghanistan.

Discord remained as to what NATO's role could be when it comes to dealing with Pakistan. A national policy planner mentioned NATO had little to offer for stabilising Pakistan. A student said that NATO should facilitate *military cooperation between India and Pakistan*, for example by fostering cooperation during NATO-led missions. A NATO official mentioned that NATO should strengthen the state of Pakistan by supporting its armed forces. Also, a national policy planner stated:

In addition, we need to keep shoring up Pakistan and do everything possible to keep moving it toward a stable and secure state. We must push Pakistan to be more helpful in keeping it's borders secure.

A participant from a non-governmental organisation believed that the only solution lay in taking an even broader approach than including Pakistan as part of the Afghanistan crisis. Instead, he argued for a regional approach encompassing concerns over India and Pakistan, the situation regarding Iran and the insurgency in the 'AfPak' region, as they were all interconnected:

Develop a Stability Pact for the region (a regional approach to address pressing issues such as the trafficking of drugs, economic cooperation, etc. with a coordinated approach from donors . Get Iran involved and provide [it with an] opportunity to play a constructive role in the region.

One option from developing a broad regional initiative would be to include China more closely. As an expert of the think tank community noted:

“

So far China has been watching developments in Afghanistan from a distance. However, if the situation deteriorates significantly we are most likely to see a more active Chinese engagement, because the stability of Afghanistan is important for different pipeline projects that run from Iran via Pakistan and Afghanistan to China.

”

Cooperation in a broader framework, whether it was an increased number of organisations or states, or whether it meant developing a strategy for the broader region, the overarching concept referred to was the ‘comprehensive approach’.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The Alliance shows little ability to effectively integrate with other instruments such as development assistance, in an effort that has become known as the comprehensive approach. Formulating an effective comprehensive approach for the mission in Afghanistan was held by a think tank participant as:

“

One of the most important contributions of NATO towards solving today’s and tomorrow’s security problems.

”

Additionally, a national policy planner said that NATO:

“

Has to take into account the military-civilian challenge more seriously, accepting to share leadership (or even to hand it to other organisations as the UN) and to insert in a more global and comprehensive strategy, but also to find new and more effective means to do counter-insurgency.

”

There was, however, little consensus about what the comprehensive approach is, and what it includes. According to an industry official, the comprehensive approach involved:

“

Reaching out to other countries and international organisations, stepping up synergies between military and civilian tools.

”

Likewise, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that for NATO the comprehensive approach meant the cooperation with other organisations.³² US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the approach encompassed:

“

Strengthening the civilian side” of the operation in Afghanistan, emphasising “governance, training of the police, development ... rule-of-law issues, corruption, counternarcotics.”³³

”

One of the problems, however, as explained by a think tank expert, was that the comprehensive approach was believed to be too heavily driven by the military, which “leads many civil actors to oppose or to react cautiously”.

An NGO participant said that for establishing a comprehensive approach it was necessary to:

“

Delink military action from humanitarian action, but enhance fora for discussion between the two spheres”. Thus the comprehensive approach should be based on coordination and communication, rather than the military substituting efforts of the civilian partners.

”

A think tank participant elaborated on what NATO could do with a comprehensive approach. First, NATO could “advance the agenda” of the comprehensive approach among the various organisations involved. Second, NATO could:

“

Develop instruments for reforming national security sectors along the comprehensive approach philosophy.

”

In other words, if effective it could become a new areas of NATO’s competitive advantage.

32) Remarks by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North, Reykjavik, 29 January 2009.

33) Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates en route to Krakow”, 18 February 2009, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4355>.

NATO also had a role to play in “*advancing homeland security and resilience*” in producer and transit countries:

“

The more we stabilise these regions from within, the more we reduce the need for outside intervention and help advance the security of the NATO homeland.

”

Thus, NATO’s interest in the comprehensive approach was held to flow from strategic interest in promoting stabilisation. One policy planner noted that:

“

NATO has to find other means than membership to expand its stabilisation wave. The comprehensive approach, if successful could be one of those means.

”

This assessment ties in with concern expressed over NATO’s troubled enlargement policy. This is a topic to which we will return in the next chapter.

Although there was no consensus about the actual content of a comprehensive approach, there was consensus that it should be developed and that it involves greater cooperation among various organisations. In addition, there was a belief that an effective comprehensive approach could lead to success in Afghanistan and offer the Alliance new competitive advantage. The rest, however, remained elusive.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Respondents suggested that an effective comprehensive approach necessitated legitimising it to local populations. According to a think tank expert allied capitals find it difficult to communicate to their electorates that the military, read NATO, is a necessary component of any comprehensive approach:

“

Many citizens in Western countries want their countries to spend more on aid operations than on NATO military operations, without realising that NATO military operations make it possible for aid to be provided where it is needed, and for development eventually to take place. We need more public information on that. NATO should provide more support to its NGOs, the Atlantic Treaty Associations, to disseminate that kind of information.

”

Another concomitant aspect is that, according to respondents, over the past years an image has been created that only NATO is engaged in Afghanistan. NATO is the most outspoken Western organisation in the region, and it has connected its relevance more or less to success in Afghanistan. However, as a representative from the industry argued, NATO is not operating unilaterally. Rather, NATO is present in Afghanistan at the behest of the United Nations and operates in theatre with several other organisations, including multiple NGOs and the European Union. Failure in Afghanistan would thus affect all these organisations as well. Getting the strategic communications right, by conveying that the effort in Afghanistan should be seen as part of a collective, not NATO's one-man-show, could help to mobilise the momentum necessary for an effective comprehensive approach:



One of the issues with Afghanistan is that it is seen as a potential NATO failure. This is not true. Afghanistan is a UN operation with NATO providing the peacekeeping forces. If it fails it will be the UN that fails. Of course NATO must share the blame, but let's keep the right perspective. ... The perception is that the rich West is once again trying to impose a regime for their own benefit. Not that this solves the issue, but it might make our job easier if our messages to the world were couched in a more acceptable framework.



The concerns over the mission in Afghanistan, within the context of weakening alliance solidarity and the need for a comprehensive approach, lead to the following strategic dilemma:

STRATEGIC DILEMMA



THE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN IS BELIEVED TO BE OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE, BUT SUCCESS IS DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THIS REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.



Perceptions on the Alliance

In spite of all the difficulties standing in the way of NATO, there was no mainstream chorus to do away with the organisation. On the contrary, there was a strong reaffirmation of the need for a Transatlantic Alliance. Some argued that although militarily the United States would not lose its hegemonic position, a pending loss of its 'global leadership role' due to the shift in global power, could only be reasserted through a revamped Transatlantic Alliance. For Europe, as one think tank expert explained, its interest lay in:



[Insuring] that U.S. commitment to Europe is not diluted by U.S. interests in Asia or other parts of the world.



In other words, respondents considered that the United States and Europe need each other in order to maintain influence in a changing geostrategic context in which the focal point is shifting eastward.

There was substantial discussion about how the Alliance should be organised. Many argued in favour of a stronger political role of the Alliance. One NATO official argued:



NATO can provide a forum to discuss coordinated efforts to address [global] problems ... It should become a discussion body rather than only looking at pre-agreed issues.



If the Alliance was to meet the challenges posed by complex and diverse operations the organisation should have broader membership as well. One military officer pointed out the difficulties of decision-making in an enlarging Alliance:

“

The transatlantic community will be more often challenged to demonstrate decisiveness, unity, and rapid decision-making. The requirement for consensus ‘at 26 (or more in the future)’ may become an obstacle for rapid decisions. On the other hand, waiving this principle may have unpredictable consequences for the Alliance.

”

A NATO official addressed the issue saying that the Alliance Strategic Concept should:

“

focus on the creation of interdependency, political, military and economic. That will guarantee stability [in the Alliance] on the longer term.

”

In terms of organisational reform, one national policy planner went even further, elaborating on the steps to be taken to render the Alliance more effective. Underlining the truism that an Alliance is as effective as the tools at its disposal, he remarked:

“

The level of political unity needed to sustain the needs of the Alliance cannot be achieved without member nations providing adequate resources. Most of their forces should be usable, deployable and sustainable. ... The Defence Planning System should be changed to increase output, flexibility, and efficiency.

”

He proceeded to discuss necessary improvements in common funding:

“

Common funding eligibility should be broadened to include a greater portion of operational missions along with related logistics, intelligence, and communications support.

”

He then suggested changes to the Alliance command structure:



The command structure should be more streamlined: one Strategic Commander with two deputies, Operations, Transformation. ACT should have both a civilian Deputy and a military Deputy to the SC Deputy for Transformation. ACT footprint should be larger in Europe. ACT should serve both NATO and the EU. The ASG for Defence Support should be the Deputy ACT. ... The MC should be disbanded. Chods [Chiefs of Defense] should meet four times a year. The Secretary-General should have a very senior military advisor assigned to his staff. This person should also be the Military Advisor to the NAC. The International Military Staff should be integrated into the International Staff.



Several reports have been published, investigating these innovations to the organisational structure of the Alliance in greater detail. They are well worth considering in this regard.³⁴

US-EUROPEAN ISSUES

A senior officer with the EU military staff, interviewed for the purposes of this project, questioned whether “*we are organised for change*”, whether the institutional alignments are commensurate with the complexity and uncertainty of the future security environment. One of the key relationships in this regard is with the European Union.

Participants acknowledged that the European Union was likely to be strengthened as a result of the global shift in power. A think tank expert explained:



In a multipolar world with three or four powerful players, the EU has no other choice but to integrate and complement its economic union with political union. If not, individual member states might become niche players at best, while the EU as a whole will be marginalised.



³⁴) See Hamilton et al., *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century* and Naumann et al., *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*.

As a result, a policy planner said that:



NATO/EU relations must be redefined in terms of cooperation, support and supporting missions.



An improved relationship with the European Union would help the Alliance to develop a broader institutional base to deal with common problems. There was some anxiety, however, over the fact that NATO and the European Union were not cooperating as desired. In order to advance the relationship between NATO and the EU, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus must find a solution to their political conflict, a national policy planner confirmed. He stated that it was “*unbearable*” that the two organisations were not cooperating as a result of this issue.

Some strong criticism was directed at the two organisations, and particularly European governments that are member of both. A NATO official voiced concerns over the political competition between the two institutions. European politicians and populations were held to be strategically naive, failing to meet the commitments of an alliance. A key challenge, identified by a NATO official, was:



[The] lack of political focus and a willingness to deal with international security issues among NATO alliance nations and in the European Union. It is demonstrated by the lack of responsible interest and proper awareness by national populations of the EU member countries to NATO. The impact and consequences of this are huge. [A further challenge is] the ‘political’ competition between EU and NATO when trying to position themselves [globally]. This creates a confusing and distracting atmosphere with very negative effect.



Another participant commented that:



The efforts of some EU nations to bring about ‘European solutions’ without involving the US are counterproductive.



The frustration that arises between the two organisations was blamed on strategic ignorance within and among several European states. Respondents displayed concerns over the ability of European states to think strategically to bring about a coherent common approach to the major challenges their societies faced. This

obviously affected NATO as well. As a think tank expert observed:

“

In my view, the biggest security threat facing the West today is internal: the lack of internal cohesion and solidarity, the lack of mutually shared analysis and understanding of the world we face, and – perhaps most worryingly – the increasing lack in self-confidence when it comes to our ideas, power and institutions. Especially in Europe we seem to be playing the game of global transitions, [which] has only just begun, as if we have already lost it.

”

TO ENLARGE, OR NOT TO ENLARGE?

In this context, a central dilemma confronting the Alliance is enlargement. The topic of enlargement relates closely to concerns over Russia. The alliance has used the instrument of enlargement for more than fifteen years to extend stability across the European continent. The ideal of a ‘Europe, whole and free’ is now closer within reach, as a result of the enlargement policies of the 1990s. However, over the past few years enlargement has become controversial, primarily as a result of developments in the relationship with Russia. Moscow has voiced its concerns and has resorted to petro-political intimidation of some Eastern European states to underscore its disapproval of NATO enlargement. In fact, the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 can be interpreted as a veto of Georgian NATO membership. As Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in 2008:

“

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation ceased to exist twenty years ago, but to our regret at least, NATO’s expansion continues full steam ahead.³⁵

”

The topic of enlargement cannot be separated from the anticipated expansion of the Alliance with states in the Western Balkans, Georgia and Ukraine. One national policy planner was explicit, saying that if Ukraine or Georgia would be admitted to NATO:

“

NATO would return to its Cold War role of protection of its member states against Russia.

”

35) President D. Medvedev, Speech at World Policy Conference, Evian (France), 8 October, 2008.

Expected vs. Desired NATO Enlargement




Figure 5

Enlargement thus relates strongly to the dynamic of the Alliance vis-à-vis Russia. This will also be addressed in more detail later on.

Simultaneously, questions have arisen within the Alliance, whether an organisation based around the North Atlantic should envelop the Black Sea, the Caspian Region or even beyond.

We asked respondents for their views on NATO enlargement. Asked whether they expected NATO enlargement in the next three years, less than five percent did not see this happen. More than seventy percent believed that NATO would be enlarged by at least one state, while one-third believed three states would join the Alliance. There was a general consensus that enlargement would occur. We then asked the respondents whether they actually wanted enlargement.

A potential dilemma appeared. While less than five percent thought there would be no enlargement, more than thirty-five percent was not in favour of it. This perspective was particularly prevalent among national policy planners, where more than half preferred no further enlargement of the Alliance.

It demonstrates the existence of a gap. More than one-third of the respondents did

not want enlargement, but more than half did want an enlargement of sorts. In fact, contrary to what the participants believed would happen, most respondents who were in favour of enlargement wanted a substantial enlargement to occur. Namely, with “five or more states”. This latter group could be seen to represent the group of ‘global NATO supporters’. According to them NATO membership should be extended widely, well beyond the current members:




*to any democratic state that can help [NATO] fulfil its new responsibilities.*³⁶



If we look only at government respondents – NATO, national military officers and national policy planners – the same pattern emerges. Most expected NATO to enlarge with three states, while a majority wanted NATO enlargement to stop.

The gap between the desired ‘Global NATO’ and the hoped-for non-enlargement offers the basis for a strategic dilemma. It is echoed by a gap between desired and expected enlargement in general.

STRATEGIC DILEMMA




ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS, NATO ENLARGEMENT IS SEEN AS BOTH INEVITABLE AND UNDESIRABLE. THERE IS DISCORD OVER THE POLICY OF ENLARGEMENT, YET IT HAS STRATEGIC REPERCUSSIONS.



36) See for instance Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” *Foreign affairs*. 85, no. 5 (2006): 105.

Key Area of Security Emphasis by Continent and State in the next 5-10 years



Map 1

Regions of Concern

Apart from the type of challenges that the Alliance may confront in five to ten years, a further issue is the geographic spread of those challenges. Often in their responses, participants identified specific states, regions or continents when describing a security issue. Map 1 shows the states and continents that participants associated with the issues they identified. This map offers an overview of the areas of key importance to the security issues confronting the transatlantic community.

The map clearly shows that the continent of Asia and its separate countries, including Russia, dominate the security appreciations. The concern over the global shift of power leads to high scores for China, India and Russia. These states also figure when discussing the challenge of resource scarcity, due to their increasing consumption rates or importance in oil and natural gas production. This also explains the mention of Venezuela. Furthermore, the global shift in power brings Brazil to the fore as the only South American state among the rising BRIC economies. Afghanistan is included because of the strategic challenges European and North American forces confront in the country. Israel and Palestine reflect concerns over stability in the Middle East. Somalia is mentioned because of the threat of piracy, connected to state failure and energy and resource security. Concerns over energy scarcity and proliferation have led to a focus on Iran, India, North Korea and Pakistan.

The entire continent of Africa was mentioned as a source of concern, predominantly as a result of state failure, demographic concerns and the rise of piracy along its coasts. Furthermore, Canada figures on the list due to the potential security issues associated with Arctic resource competition.

Finally, the United States is mentioned as the third most important security-related area. It results from Washington's important role in the international security arena, which is believed to persist into the near future. For example, an expert in the think tank community said a key issue was:



[The] need to ensure that US commitment to Europe is not diluted by US interests in Asia or other parts of the world.



The chart below provides the first and second most mentioned areas of emphasis per community:

RESPONDENT COMMUNITY	MOST OFTEN MENTIONED AREA OF SECURITY EMPHASIS	SECOND MENTIONED AREA OF SECURITY EMPHASIS
National Military	Russia	China
National Policy Planners	Pakistan	Middle East
NATO	Afghanistan	Russia
NGO	Israel-Palestine	India
Students	US	Europe
Think tanks	China	Russia and Europe
International Organisations and European Union	Israel-Palestine	Russia
Industry	Afghanistan	

Looking at the areas that were mentioned most in the discussions, several broad observations can be made with regards to the communities:

- o Military officers specifically articulated concerns over the rise of possible peer competitors;
- o National policy planners elaborated on the destabilising potential of events in Pakistan and the Middle East;
- o NATO officials seemed to emphasise immediate concerns to the Alliance, including relations with Russia, precipitated by Moscow's war with a NATO Partnership for Peace member, Georgia, and operations in Afghanistan;
- o International organisations and the European Union, along with the non-governmental organisations, articulated specific concerns relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the shift in the global balance of power;

- o Students were more internally focused, pointing to the role of Europe and the US in security affairs;
- o Think tanks, akin to the military respondents, focused on concerns reflecting the changing international dynamic.

Some of the areas of emphasis identified were not mainstream. As an indication, the table below offers some highlights of these areas that are believed to pose challenges to international security, yet were mentioned infrequently.

NATO'S AREA OF FOCUS

We assumed that respondents were not convinced that NATO should be active in all the areas mentioned above, and instead that the Alliance would have a particular strategic focus. In order to test our assumptions, we asked the participants to identify the three regions where they believed NATO should focus its attention in the next five to ten years. Map 2 presents the results.

Across the communities the majority identified Eastern Europe including Russia, Western Asia encompassing Turkey's southern and eastern neighbourhood including Georgia, Syria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and South-Central Asia including the Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India. Besides being of geostrategic importance, these three regions have been high on NATO's agenda in the recent history: Afghanistan, Russia and Turkey's periphery including Georgia. The emphasis of the respondents on Eastern Europe illustrates continuing concerns over Russia. It implies a focus on collective defence along the Eastern European border and an argument for these border states to retain in-place forces for territorial defense. On the other hand, Western Europe, which is the traditional heartland of the Alliance, figures only marginally, revealing only limited concern over homeland security missions for NATO there.

Regarding the top three regions, Central Asia and Eastern Europe also include many partner nations of NATO. The identification of Central Asia reflects the opinion among respondents that NATO will remain active in the region, just as it is now. The participants also identified Eastern Africa as a focus region for the Alliance, reflecting the current involvement in anti-piracy missions, but also the increasing geostrategic importance of the area in relation to resource scarcity. Similarly, the concern over NATO's southern periphery was reflected in the emphasis on Northern Africa. This region also encompasses the operational theatre of Chad and Darfur.

FOCUS REGIONS	REGIONS OF CONCERN QUOTES FROM PARTICIPANTS	CHALLENGE
Central Asia	<p>This is not only because of the region's energy resources that are relevant for Russia, Europe and China. Central Asia also is a very important transport corridor – literally speaking – particularly with regard to energy supplies. So far, China has been watching developments in Afghanistan from a distance. However, if the situation deteriorates significantly we are most likely to see a more active Chinese engagement, because the stability of Afghanistan is important for different pipeline projects that run from Iran via Pakistan and Afghanistan to China</p>	<p>Resource scarcity and shift in global power and operations in Afghanistan</p>
Syria and Lebanon	<p>The Middle East, mostly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and ... Gaza, may also be faced with destabilising factors. Syria: Iraqi refugees (1-2 million straining the economy), Lebanon (Hezbollah is there to stay), Gaza (155 killed in Israeli airstrike today alone).</p>	<p>State failure and terrorism</p>
Nordic	<p>The combination of growing economies, growing shortages of industrial and natural resources and competition for these resources. ... The problem will focus on the Middle East, Africa, Nordic, but can be the cause of conflict in unexpected areas.</p> <p>Increasing competition in the Arctic region, tension between Russia, Norway, the US and Canada.</p>	<p>Resource scarcity</p>


Latin America	<p>Drug wars in South America.</p> <p>The growing disarray existing in Latin America towards the common values that uphold the transatlantic community.</p> <p>China and Russia make deals with countries belonging traditionally to America's sphere of influence, in particular in South America. This will unavoidably lead to frictions.</p>	<p>Organised crime and global shift in power</p>
Indonesia	<p>I think that especially in Asia there are many terrorist attacks yet to come. Especially in countries like India, Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan.</p>	<p>Terrorism</p>

However, of particular interest are the regions mentioned beyond this top three, or those that were only mentioned in the margin, but received a mention nonetheless. A sizeable group of participants emphasised a role for NATO in Middle Africa. This region, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, has not been high on the Alliance's agenda. Any NATO activity there would amount to an expansion of NATO's area of operations. The region itself is subject to wholesale instability, conflicts over valuable resources and state failure. This region was particularly emphasised by the think tank and military officer communities. West Africa is likewise mentioned, particularly by students, possibly as a result of concerns over state failure in combination with resource scarcity.

The mention of Southern Africa may be the result of state failure in Zimbabwe. Southeast Asia occurs in the margin, very likely as a result of the dynamic interplay between resource concerns, the proliferation of piracy in the strategic chokepoint of the Malacca Straits and the threat of terrorism in the region. East Asia figures marginally, either in relation to concerns over North Korean nuclear proliferation or the rise of China as a potential military competitor for the Alliance.

A definite outlier is the mention of South America, being located far beyond the Alliance's territory and its traditional strategic focus. But it may reflect the concern over

Which regions in the world do you believe will command most of NATO's attention in the next 5-10 years?



Map 2

developments in Venezuela, which is one of the world's premier oil-producing nations led by an anti-Western president, within the context of the broader issue of energy scarcity.

Relatively little concern – equal to Southeast Asia – was appropriated to Southern Europe, the European region including the Balkans. This is surprising given the current focus of the Alliance on the Balkans. Before drawing a conclusion, this low score could be the result of the accounting method, concerns over Kosovo may be captured in the score for the region of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, this may also reflect the view that the Balkans will no longer be a central security concern for the Alliance in the next ten years. This is corroborated by the fact that hardly any security issues were identified relating to the Balkans. Finally, North America and Scandinavia are highlighted, most likely as a result of concerns over pending resource competition in the Arctic.

Eastern Europe figured strongly across all the communities. Some distinctions can be made however. NATO participants particularly identified South-Central Asia and Eastern Africa as the dominant regions of concern. This undoubtedly reflected current operations in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, military officers singled out Northern Africa and the Middle East, which may reflect current operations in a wider non-NATO context - such as the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon - or concerns over the geographic proximity of these regions to Europe.

Comparing maps 1 and 2, it becomes apparent that although there is a general understanding that China is among the key areas of emphasis for the next decade, NATO is expected to play an embryonic role with regards to it at best. Conversely, different parts of Africa, and more specifically East Africa, North Africa and Central Africa, figure much more prominently as a future focus area for NATO than may be deduced from the map depicting the global spread of security concerns.

What is perhaps most relevant in these results is that the respondents in New Horizons envisage a very broad 'out-of-area' focus for the Alliance, while simultaneously identifying as key region of concern the geographic proximity of Eastern Europe and Russia. In terms of capabilities, this map illustrates one of the salient dilemmas for the Alliance. There seems to be ample argument to move ahead with the transformation of allied armed forces for expeditionary operations. However, as a result of the persistent concern over NATO's eastern periphery, it does not shut the door to the argument advanced by some nations to retain in-place forces for territorial defence.

The map explains the strategic discussion over what the strategic focus of the Alliance should be. As NATO's Secretary-General De Hoop Scheffer said in reference to the High North:



Clearly, the High North is a region that is of strategic interest to the Alliance. But so are the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. There are many regions – but there is only one NATO.³⁷



This indivisibility of capabilities will continue to burden the Alliance, as it will try to combine both an outward-looking posture of truly global 'out-of-area' missions with a closer to home mission in the Eastern periphery. Formulating the right priorities from among the different strategic focus areas is one of the primary challenges for the Alliance.

STRATEGIC ORIENTATION: GLOBAL FOCUS OR THE IMMEDIATE PERIPHERY?

We also asked the participants which description would best suit NATO's strategic mission spectrum.³⁸ The responses showed a nearly fifty-fifty split between focusing on global expeditionary operations and an emphasis on operations in NATO's immediate periphery. Among the different communities, the majority of military officers, NATO officials and think tank experts favored global expeditionary operations, while national policy planners and NGOs mostly preferred a focus on NATO's periphery. National policy planners were similarly inclined to place a focus on Eastern Europe and Western Asia in the previous question, as opposed to only a few NATO officials doing the same. It may thus be said that policy planners show a tendency to be more focused on the immediate environment, whereas NATO officials have a broader operational scope.

37) Remarks by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North, Reykjavik, 29 January 2009.

38) Participants could choose between: (a) business as usual (no change from today), (b) out of area or out of business (focused on global expeditionary operations), (c) in area or in trouble (focus on operations inside NATO territory), (d) good neighbours (focused on the immediate NATO environs).

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE VS AWAY MISSIONS?

From a capabilities perspective, the more or less equal division between a NATO focused on the immediate neighbourhood and a global expeditionary NATO can be read as presenting a dilemma between in-place forces and the need for expeditionary capabilities.


Taking the spread of NATO's regions of concern as the basis, we can overlay it with a mission focus (see Map 3). This identifies a strategic orientation for each key security region identified above. This strategic orientation ranges from homeland security operations, to collective defense and expeditionary 'away' missions.

The map shows that the region of Eastern Europe is primarily oriented towards collective defence. And although it has been identified by the greatest number of respondents as NATO's key region of concern, it is dwarfed by the region that encompasses the likely 'away' missions for the Alliance. The collective defence region stretches from Eastern Europe up to the Nordic where resource competition is a source of concern. The region of possible NATO 'away' missions includes the Middle East, Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Central Asia, but also – albeit less likely – South Africa, South America and Southeast Asia. In addition, a homeland security mission is included for Western Europe and North America.

This creates a dilemma for NATO's strategic positioning. Given that the community of New Horizons believes NATO's area of operations may become global, how does it deal with the majority emphasis on Eastern Europe, as this may lead to a rationale for different force structuring among the Eastern European member states? How does this relate to NATO's ongoing efforts to transform into an expeditionary alliance?

For a nation like the Netherlands or the United States operations on Europe's eastern periphery are expeditionary, and strategically deployable forces would be required. But for NATO member states along the Russian border the identification of their region as the key area of concern may offer them a justification to maintain legacy forces for territorial defence. According to a NATO official, interviewed for this project, this is precisely the case. In his view the difference in orientation between global expeditionary operations and collective defence – predominantly focused at the perceived threat from Russia – may be attributed to specific regions. On the one hand, he said, states like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark and of course the United States, who are physically and historically distanced from Russia, have embraced

Which regions in the world do you believe will command most of NATO's attention in the next 5-10 years?



Map 3

‘away’ missions, whereas the former Warsaw Pact countries including Poland and the Baltics are keen to underline the traditional collective defence role of the Alliance.

This reflects the core challenge posed by the changing international security environment vis-à-vis the interpretation of Article V of the Alliance Treaty. If territorial defence along NATO’s eastern periphery is considered to be salient, it will dominate force considerations with those that emphasise it. Similarly, member states that emphasise ‘away’ missions will transform their armed forces into expeditionary forces.

Different strategic orientations among members of the Alliance correspond to different force structuring priorities. This explains the difficulty in generating forces for NATO ‘away’ missions. It is also a symptom of a differing understanding of solidarity; divided between traditional collective defence or for expeditionary missions. Without consensus as to what the strategic focus of the Alliance is, it will be difficult to sustain solidarity, generate sufficient forces and sustain political cohesion, particularly in the event of sustained global expeditionary combat operations.

A NEW COUNTER-CONCENTRATION?

The debate that takes place over ‘away’ missions and collective defence is reminiscent of the discussion over counter-concentration in the early 1990s. At the time, the security environment was in flux and it was uncertain where the next challenge would arise, requiring either a collective defence or a crisis management mission?. It had also become clear that NATO could no longer sustain a linear defence posture. Instead, to live up to its security guarantee NATO forces required strategic mobility and flexibility of forces to deploy rapid reaction forces to block an adversarial advance wherever it might arise in Europe, while follow-on forces provided the counterweight. This became known as mobile counter-concentration.



This concept calls for forces to possess greater mobility and flexibility than in the past...³⁹



These rapid reaction forces could also be used for crisis response. At the time, this was a controversial issue, because many allies did not have the force structure needed to realise this concept. Mobile counter-concentration was designed to enable collective

39) Thomas-Durell Young and Army War College (U.S.), *Multinational land formations and NATO reforming practices and structures* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997), p. 11.

defense with fewer forces available, as well as crisis response missions. Currently, the discussion on developing expeditionary forces for sustained combat operations should be seen in a similar light. NATO suffers from a substantial lack of forces to deal with the security challenges it confronts. These challenges may have dimensions of either collective defense or 'away' missions. Just as strategic mobility was required for mobile counter-concentration and crisis-management operations, expeditionary forces are now needed both for collective defense and 'away' missions.

The participants emphasising the challenges in the eastern periphery of the NATO area are likely to promote the structuring of their capabilities along the principles of in-place forces, or retain legacy forces. Participants advancing the cause of 'away' challenges are likely to structure their capabilities along the principles of expeditionary armed forces. If, however, the Alliance can ensure that collective defence is believed to require expeditionary capabilities, the dilemma can be solved.

In this regard, the trend towards expeditionary capabilities is just as necessary as the shift to counter-concentration in the mid-1990s. This presents the Alliance with the following dilemma:




STRATEGIC DILEMMA

DIVERGENT VIEWS ON NATO'S KEY AREAS OF CONCERN RESULT IN DIVERGENT VIEWS ABOUT HOW TO STRUCTURE ITS CAPABILITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THIS WILL LEAD TO NATO'S INABILITY TO DEVELOP ADEQUATE FORCES THAT CAN BE DEPLOYED FOR A WIDE SPECTRUM OF MISSIONS.



SECURITY ISSUES AND LOCATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY

RUSSIA



Dealing with Russia



[Of central concern is] the effect that the challenge of dealing with a more assertive Russia might have upon intra-transatlantic and intra-European cohesion.



-New Horizons participant from think tank community of experts

As mentioned above, NATO's eastern periphery remains a key area for the Alliance, and indeed concern over Russia was widespread throughout the consultations. Across all communities, this was the country that most participants dwelled upon.

Russia controls roughly a quarter of all known natural gas reserves. It produces one-fifth of the global natural gas supplies and one-seventh of all oil. This makes Russia a key player in the new global dynamic, shaped by a multipolar world and global resource scarcity.

In the past few years, the Kremlin has demonstrated great resolve to make its voice heard on the international stage, expressing Russian concern over marginalisation by the West. Moscow has not shied away from using gas exports as a weapon of political intimidation, or the national gas company GazProm as an extension of the state. This

is cause for worry for European states which are dependent on Russian natural gas supplies. Also, the Kremlin has launched an ambitious programme to transform its armed forces. The country retains over 16,000 nuclear warheads and ample stocks of highly-enriched uranium. The most obvious recent Russian show of force was the intervention in South Ossetia and Georgia in August 2008. As Russia's President Dmitry Medvedev said:

“

*Russia will never allow anyone to infringe upon the lives and dignity of its citizens. Russia is a nation to be reckoned with from now on.*⁴⁰

”

A third of the references to Russia by the respondents were made in relation to the global shift of power. A national policy planner commented, while referring to Robert Kagan's recent book on the rise of multipolarity:⁴¹

“

Russia [is] still using the politics of power like in the nineteenth century (see the war with Georgia last summer), while a divided Europe looks to supranational/intergovernmental measures to act in the international system.

”

A think tank expert concurred, offering that a key challenge was:

“

the threat of Russian hegemonic actions that infringe on the sovereign rights of NATO members or NATO partners.

”

These remarks reflect experiences with Russian foreign policy over the past few years, when the country went to war with Georgia, used its natural gas exports as a tool of political blackmail against its neighbours and increased its rhetoric, claiming a larger role in the international arena. All this has been fuelled by high oil prices filling the Russian treasury in Moscow.

There was some discussion about the extent to which Russian power depended on a high oil price. One think tank expert said that there was a relation between Russian behaviour and high oil prices, whereas another commented that:

40) Yuras Karmanau, "Medvedev Says Russia 'Nation to be Reckoned With'", USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-06-3534143527_x.htm, 27 November, 2008.

41) Robert Kagan, *The Return Of History And The End Of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008).

“

Having tasted this renewed power, a downturn in the oil economy is not going to reverse the situation in the short term [for Russia].

”

Within the community of national military staffs there was an ongoing discussion how to interpret Russian behaviour. Disagreement emerged. One military officer commented that:

“

[Russia's] rapidly increasing resource requirements and growing economies are forcing [it] to expand in an often reckless manner, which poses consequential security threats in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

”

Another officer agreed, stating that Russia would claim a “more and more dominant position on the world scene”.

Others held opposing views. One officer mentioned that Russia’s “dependence on the West as its main customer” for its natural gas export meant that a “new Cold War will not happen”. Another commented that:

“

Russia will have [internal] problems in terms of demography” adding that Russia’s influence depends too much on oil and natural gas

”

However, there was also a military officer who believed that there is an ideological driver behind the Russian government’s ambition to play a stronger role in the international system:

“

Russia is eager to regain the position of a world superpower, to expand its influence and to build strategic partnerships. It will use every occasion to achieve or demonstrate predominance in various spheres – politics, military, economy, etc.

”

RELEVANT QUOTES

CHALLENGES WITHIN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

National Policy Planners	The frozen conflicts of the Trans-Caucacus region, in combination with a Russian ‘attitude’ that may well contribute to instability and conflict in the region.
NATO	Return of tensions between West and Russia, caused by a combination of a possible return of opposing political ideologies, energy security and competition for other industrial resources, competition for power.
National Military	<i>Ongoing differences between regional powers over regional and/or global dominance (India, China, Russia, USA). The differences are, if they remain unsolved, likely to erupt in regionally limited clashes of violent conflict.</i>
Students	<i>Russia is not a threat as much as it is a potential source of instability. Its actions in the European Eastern neighbourhood as well as on energy issues are of much concern to Europe. However, if Europe and the US act together towards Russia, this could even become a partner in assuring stability.</i>
International Organisations and European Union	<i>As an important building block for economic security, energy security can be seen as the second most important security issue ... it has ramifications for the relations with other large energy suppliers, Russia in particular.</i>
Think Tanks	<i>The effects that the challenge of dealing with a more assertive Russia might have upon intra-transatlantic and intra-European cohesion.</i>

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

Just as there was no common view on the nature of the security challenge Russia represents, there was no common position on how NATO should deal with Russia. Views ranged from co-opting the country, because it had the potential to become an important ally in some respects, to NATO acting as a strong counterbalance. Regarding the first perspective, a student pointed out:

“

Russia is not a threat as much as it is a potential source of instability. Its actions in the Eastern European neighborhood as well as on energy issues are of much concern to Europe. However, if Europe and the US act together towards Russia, this could even become a partner in assuring stability.

”

Similarly, there was substantial support for cooperation with Russia in developing solutions to regional challenges, for instance with regards to Trans-Caucasus issues. This included concerns over the development of energy resources in the Caspian Region, which could become critical as oil supplies elsewhere come under pressure. A national policy-maker believed this amounted to a negative incentive to cooperate with Russia:

“

Russia needs to be included as a part of the solution, otherwise they will continue to be a part of the problem.

”

According to a policy planner, NATO needs to cooperate with Russia on common challenges such as proliferation and arms control, without giving up on its own interests:

“

This means that NATO should keep the channel of dialogue on security issues with Russia always open, even on issues we differ upon or in situations of direct conflict of interest. Russia's concerns on CSE, Missile Defence, Kosovo and enlargement should be taken more seriously than before, without giving in, however, on essential values that are the basis of the Alliance (democracy, human rights, etc.) We should build confidence with the ultimate aim of addressing our common security concerns.

”

A national policy planner promoted greater EU-Russian cooperation, as opposed to enhanced NATO-Russian cooperation, given its political-economic nature rather than a military appearance:

“

To prevent the rise of nationalistic tensions in and around Europe, [EU cooperation should be deepened]. In terms of Russia, one might use economic rather than military tools to cope with Putin. [There is] no specific role for NATO, as that may only inflame the situation.

”

Another think tank expert called for accepting Russia as a Great Power in the first place, assuming that all Russia wanted was international recognition of its new position on the international stage. Turning the burden of proof around, the respondent stated:

“

[T]he image of Russia is not only [a] question for Russians. Do we know Russians? Russian relations require effort and energy and Russia should be taken as Great Power. That would at least be a start.

”

However, when it came to issues of NATO's eastern periphery or Russia's former sphere of influence, a different tone was heard. As an expert in the think tank community assessed, the key challenge was addressing concerns in “*the Post-Soviet space*”. A national policy planner advocated a rapid enlargement of NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia to ‘pre-empt’ Russia with the intent of creating a *fait accompli*. The respondent mentioned that this would create:

“

A small Cold War on the European continent ... [albeit] stable though.

”

A different policy planner believed that:

“

NATO would return to its Cold War role of protection of its member states against Russia.

”

According to one policy planner NATO “*has to answer the Russia challenge.*” However, he added that NATO could not simply continue to enlarge without taking account of Russian concerns:



NATO has to find other means than membership to expand its stabilisation wave.



The policy planner was referring to stability operations, or to developing an effective Comprehensive Approach as an alternative instrument that can export stability. This would be a substitute for the tool of enlargement that has antagonized Russia, yet has been NATO's primary stability-promoting instrument over the years.


In this chapter we saw that there is significant concern over NATO's relations with Russia. It leads to a tendency by some to reassert traditional collective defence, while others favour increased cooperation with Russia.

This leads to the following strategic dilemma:

STRATEGIC DILEMMA



DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IS HIGHLY COMPLICATED, SINCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE RUSSIA IS SEEN AS A THREAT BY SOME AND A NECESSARY PARTNER BY OTHERS.



SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

Finding a path away from NATO's de-solidarisation

The *New Horizons* consultations lead to several observations on NATO's future. De-solidarisation is a central issue of concern. The security environment over the next five to ten years will present the Alliance with a series of challenges that will test the foundation of its solidarity. The overarching strategic necessity is for the Alliance to reconcile its traditional role with new challenges.

Eight strategic dilemmas follow from the consultations. They relate to:

- o The impact of the shift to a multipolar system and the global economic recession on the Alliance's credibility and capabilities, and the increasing global demand for security;
- o NATO's role in resource scarcity;
- o The need for NATO to address proliferation and redefine its deterrent posture;
- o The demand to increase NATO's strategic ambitions;
- o The difficulty to achieve success in Afghanistan;
- o The discord over NATO's strategic orientation;
- o Divergent views on NATO enlargement;
- o The discord over relations with Russia.

A new Alliance Strategic Concept must find a resolution to these dilemmas.

Drafting such a document is considered a necessity by more than two-thirds of the NATO participants, seventy percent of think tank experts, three out of four national policy planners, and four out of five national military officers taking part in the consultations. Three in four participants in the entire project believed the Alliance should reassess its strategic purpose and foundation.

In the next few pages the strategic dilemmas flowing from *New Horizons* are presented, followed by the most important observations regarding the results of the consultations and comments on the project itself. Finally, we end by providing our perspective on how the Alliance may cope with the strategic dilemmas.

THE STRATEGIC DILEMMAS

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION WILL CREATE MORE AND GREATER SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR THE WEST, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WEST AND WEAKEN NATO'S CAPABILITY TO ACT.

NATO was founded at a time when the West was one of two major global powers. It adjusted to a period known as the 'unipolar moment' which saw the Alliance engage in peacekeeping and crisis management operations. Yet, as a result of the global financial crisis and the global shift in power from the West to the East, the Alliance now needs to adjust once more to find its place in a security environment defined by multiple centres of power, and the West only being one of these. At the same time, the results suggest that the financial crisis will impact the West's credibility and its wherewithal to deal with the expected proliferation of instability in key areas.

RESOURCE AND ENERGY SCARCITY ARE HELD TO BE KEY CHALLENGES, BUT RESPONDENTS BELIEVE NATO REMAINS UNDECIDED HOW TO RESPOND.

The multipolar system, increasing global consumption of oil and natural gas, and the aftershocks associated with the global economic recession will strengthen the dynamic of resource competition. This is likely to affect the Arctic area of responsibility of the Alliance as well. NATO's position on coping with the dynamic of resource and energy security remains underdeveloped. Respondents advanced arguments for NATO to commit to protecting key energy transit routes, through presence patrols, show of force missions or exercises deterring threats to energy supplies or engaging in a policy to stabilise key transit states. A new strategic concept would need to address a clearer

position on energy security.

DEFINING NATO'S POSITION ON PROLIFERATION REQUIRES ADDRESSING NATO'S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, THE ALLIANCE'S NUCLEAR POSTURE AND THE ALLIANCE'S CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE. BUT THE BEST WAY TO DETER NON-STATE ACTORS IS AS YET UNKNOWN, AS IS THE NATURE OF A NEW NUCLEAR POSTURE AND A ROLE FOR THE ALLIANCE IN SUPPORTING A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME REMAINS UNCERTAIN.

The proliferation of critical technologies, particularly associated with nuclear weapons, is considered a defining challenge for the next five to ten years. Respondents identified a need to reassess the international non-proliferation regime and dwelled on the possible role of NATO in assisting its enforcement. There was however, no consensus. As an example, the discussion about NATO's position towards Iran brought a variety of options to light. Primary concern however, was dedicated to proliferation in relation to terrorist groups. This presents a dilemma regarding the Alliance's traditional posture of deterrence. On the other hand, it affirmed the necessity to develop key capabilities to assist states in counter-proliferation, including forces for sustained expeditionary combat missions.

KEY SECURITY TRENDS (STATE FAILURE, NON-STATE ACTORS AND TERRORISM, DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIETAL VULNERABILITIES) OFFER A POWERFUL IMPETUS TO CHANGE NATO'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION TOWARDS A BROAD EXPEDITIONARY ALLIANCE EMBEDDED IN INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES AND TO ADDRESS SOCIETAL RESILIENCE, BUT IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE ALLIANCE CAN LIVE UP TO THIS AMBITIOUS AGENDA.

The respondents identified a series of key security trends in the form of state failure, terrorism, demographic trends, and concerns related to societal vulnerabilities. Regarding state failure, there was consensus that NATO had an important role to play in capacity-building in states subjected to failure, either through developing partner capabilities or by engaging in stability operations in a broader international context in these areas.

On the topic of dealing with terrorism, a softer approach was envisioned including talking to particular groups, stressing strategic communication and dealing with root causes in a broad international effort. "*Security strategies ... still too much focus on just one dimension*", a respondent said. For NATO it implies developing a true counter-

terrorism policy in collaboration with other international institutions. The respondents defined a need for a comprehensive approach, but left the elements of such an approach largely undefined.

The demographic concerns relate to migration towards the West as well as dealing with regional instability precipitated by population growth. This required a set of initiatives to stimulate economic opportunities in developing countries, as well as improving the ability of Western states to integrate immigrant populations in their societies. The respondents envisioned a role for NATO where it would increase the capabilities of third countries to cope with demographic stress, as well as assist in controlling Western borders.

Finally, domestic vulnerabilities resulting from the interconnectedness of global economies, politics and societies, were considered to be a key concern. Western societies are vulnerable to exploitation and must be made resilient to cyber-threats, or the secondary effects of military competition in space. The respondents that signalled these concerns believed it required an expansion of NATO's capabilities, for instance in the field of cyber-protection. The security trends also beg the question whether NATO's interpretation of Article V is still adequate. The collective defence clause only takes limited account of the deliberate incapacitation of a society by an instrument other than war, such as cyber-terrorism.

Dealing with these security trends requires a capability for sustained expeditionary combat operations, including a capacity to perform stability operations, in order to address the challenges connected to state failure, terrorism and demographics. It also requires increased societal resilience and efforts in the field homeland security to deal with vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure.

The strategic dilemma is that if the Alliance addresses these security trends, this amounts to an ambitious agenda on which the Alliance has yet to develop an effective strategic policy and obtain consensus among its members.

THE MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN IS BELIEVED TO BE OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE, BUT SUCCESS IS DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THIS REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH.

NATO's operation in Afghanistan reveals some of the strenuous issues facing the internal cohesion of the Alliance. Whether it relates to national caveats and the discussion as to what alliance solidarity implies, or the ability to generate adequate forces to perform a

counter-insurgency operation. Failure to achieve success is considered a strategic loss to the Alliance, yet there is discord over how to achieve success. A clear understanding of what success in Afghanistan entails is lacking, let alone how it can be measured.

There appeared to be consensus that working towards a solution of sorts required integrating Afghanistan into a broader regional approach, including Pakistan and possibly India. Similarly, respondents advocated a comprehensive approach, but did not work out in detail how to bring this about. From a capabilities perspective, this underlined a further inclination to improve on NATO's stabilisation capacity, particularly for sustained expeditionary combat operations and to develop close working relations with other institutions.

Since 1991, NATO has embraced the objective to establish a set of 'mutually reinforcing institutions' to improve European security. It was based on the recognition that no one institution could address European security concerns by itself. To improve the Alliance's chances of success in complex emergencies such as Afghanistan, an effective collaboration among mutually reinforcing institutions is necessary as well. This can serve as the basis for a comprehensive approach.

**DIVERGENT VIEWS ON NATO'S KEY AREAS OF CONCERN RESULT
IN DIVERGENT VIEWS ABOUT HOW TO STRUCTURE ITS CAPABILITIES.
THIS LEADS TO NATO'S INABILITY TO DEVELOP ADEQUATE FORCES
THAT CAN BE DEPLOYED FOR A WIDE SPECTRUM OF MISSIONS.**

Among the key dilemmas facing the Alliance is the necessity to reach consensus on its strategic orientation. Most respondents placed a central emphasis of the Alliance on Eastern Europe and Russia, followed by the Middle East, Central Asia and East Africa. Participants similarly voiced concern that NATO interests might be at stake in the next ten years in South America, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. This divergence between Eastern Europe on the one hand, and a broader geographical orientation on the other hand, reflects a differing focus by NATO member states on collective defence and 'away' missions.

This distinction explains why NATO member states emphasising 'away' missions will transform their armed forces into expeditionary forces, while member states that are in favour of collective defence tend to retain in-place forces unsuitable for sustained expeditionary combat operations.

DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA IS HIGHLY COMPLICATED SINCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE RUSSIA IS SEEN AS A THREAT BY SOME AND A NECESSARY PARTNER BY OTHERS.

Russia's assertive re-emergence as a central player in the international security dynamic results in divergence among NATO's member states. The country plays a role in several key challenges, including resource and energy scarcity, proliferation and the global shift of power to a multipolar system. Moscow has already demonstrated a willingness to use its power instruments to encroach on the vital interests of several European states, and possibly there is more to come. The Alliance is divided over a proper response, with views ranging from engaging Russia on common issues of interest to risking a new Cold War. This has clear repercussions for the Alliance's strategic posture as well as for the required capabilities.

This underlines the dilemma mentioned above and reinforces the notion that some member states emphasise in-place forces for collective defence. The inability of these forces to contribute to high-risk 'away' missions affects the expected mutual burden-sharing and weakens solidarity in the Alliance. NATO must reach agreement on the strategic orientation of the Alliance and its consequences for force structuring.

ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS, NATO ENLARGEMENT IS SEEN AS BOTH INEVITABLE AND UNDESIRABLE. THERE IS DISCORD OVER THE POLICY OF ENLARGEMENT, YET IT WILL HAVE STRATEGIC REPERCUSSIONS.

The enlargement of NATO has been a central policy instrument of the Alliance for the past fifteen years. However, there is discord among the respondents whether in fact the Alliance should continue to enlarge eastward. Concerns over Russia's development are dominant, mainly as a result of the Russian actions in 2008. This leads to the conclusion that the direction of enlargement is all but defined and should not be considered in the same light as during the 1990s.

OBSERVATIONS FOLLOWING FROM THE RESULTS

The following is a list of the ten most important observations related to the project:

- 1) While we asked respondents to formulate opportunities as well as challenges facing the Alliance, their responses mostly focused on challenges. This portrays a general tendency in the broader security policy community to emphasise risks rather than to identify chances. Furthermore, respondents developed quite elaborate views on the key security challenges that confront the Alliance. This was followed by a substantial, but smaller number of proposed solutions, and fairly few responses regarding the implications for NATO. Nearly fifty percent of the responses related to challenges, while less than one-fifth related to implications for NATO.
- 2) Most remarks on solutions were either very general excluding specifics, pessimistic or idealistic and unpractical. This may reflect the current sentiment among the broader policy community and be an indicator that there is some room for creative thinking. For instance, a very generic solution concerns the following, with regards to dealing with the challenge of the global shift in power; a policy planner responded by saying it required:



International solidarity, investing in the multilateral system and transparent governance.



Or, as noted by a representative from the industry, discussing addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism:



Having the relevant international organisations working together in a comprehensive way to try to anticipate such security implications and develop in advance anticipatory measures/solutions that can help deal with the problem.



- 3) Coupled to this is the fact that many solutions referred to institutionalism. Solutions were considered to lie in developing better relations among different institutions or developing new institutions altogether. Respondents favoured solutions where NATO operates more closely with the United Nations, or in a multilateral framework with others.

- 4) There was a substantial amount of ‘presentism’ in the thinking of the participants, meaning there was an emphasis on the security issues of today. While we deliberately asked for an identification of challenges and opportunities over the period in five to ten years time, meaning that they were required to look at issues just beyond the current horizon, many of the challenges identified were drawn from current concerns. This may lead to the conclusion that practitioners and experts are consumed by the events of the day and that as a complement to *New Horizons*, there is room to robustly test the results of the consultation on foresight analyses.
- 5) There appears to be a disconnect between NATO officials and national policy planners when it comes to strategic orientation. While NATO officials emphasised the challenges within the Alliance, policy planners hardly identified this challenge at all. Furthermore, concerning regional areas of concern the policy planners tend to be more focused on the immediate environs of the Alliance, while NATO officials and military officers have a broader, global operational scope.
- 6) Participants expect demands on NATO’s expeditionary capabilities to remain high, particularly for longer term stabilisation activities. This is derived from the global shift in power, the greater demand for security, resource scarcity, demographic trends, state failure and others. This leads to a necessity to strengthen NATO’s capabilities for sustained expeditionary combat operations.
- 7) The debate on proliferation is dominated by concerns over nuclear weapons. While other weapons of mass destruction, such as biological agents, were mentioned, rarely nuclear weapons dominated the discussion. One wonders if this is an accurate reflection of the actual risk.
- 8) International crime and pandemics were left nearly untouched, even though studies have pointed out that they are among the most pertinent threats for the years ahead. One think tank expert commented on the threat posed by pandemics:

“

Currently it’s on the backburner in many countries, but it should not be. SARS, bird flu, hoof and mouth, etc. have all had devastating effects on national and international economies.

”

Another think tank expert noted: *“In the Netherlands national risk assessment this [pandemics] was ranked number 1”*. Even so, the issue was hardly mentioned by the respondents. As a solution the respondent involved proposed that global

health care should be strengthened *"in particular in the poorest countries"*, albeit that for NATO he envisaged *"no role"*.

- 9) There appears to be consensus that European states and the United States need each other to tackle important security challenges. However, there is concern over the ability of these states to overcome philosophical and institutional differences.
- 10) The relationship with the European Union was not held by the respondents to be as central an issue as initially expected. Nevertheless, those concerns that were expressed were unrelenting. For instance, a NATO official noted:



[A key concern is the] lack of political focus and a willingness to deal with international security issues among NATO alliance nations and in the European Union. It is demonstrated by the lack of responsible interest and proper awareness by national populations of the EU member countries to NATO. The impact and consequences of this are huge.



Others found it *"unbearable"* that NATO and the European Union do not cooperate due to the issues between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece.

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT *NEW HORIZONS*

We have answered the question how practitioners and experts of transatlantic security think about the future of the Alliance. Over a period of five months between late 2008 and early 2009 we consulted the opinions and views of more than three hundred stakeholders of the Alliance. In this exercise, the first of its kind as far as we know, we deliberately wanted to invite those who work on transatlantic issues on a daily basis, but who are often not at liberty to speak in view of national governmental restraints. This led us to include national policy planners, military officers and NATO and EU officials. Using an innovative software platform we were able to solicit their participation, while respecting the critical condition of anonymity, hopefully removing possible inhibitions to speak freely. As a result, although we know from which community a given opinion is drawn, as illustrated by the prolific use of quotes, we do not know from which specific individual quotes originated. Participation was on an invitation-only basis, in order to guarantee control over the quality of participants. While it is impossible to

verify whether respondents spoke their mind, we have attempted to remove as many barriers as possible to truly capture how respondents think about the future of the Alliance.

In addition to these policy officials and military staffs, we set out to include individuals who are usually not included, but who do have a stake in the future of NATO. This led us to invite representatives from non-governmental organisations, the industry, as well as the broader community of international organisations and university students. Finally, sizeable participation came from the group of transatlantic think tank experts. However, we believe that transatlantic security issues are more diverse than ever before. This made it necessary to include different groups of people in similar consultation exercises.

It is our belief that collecting the opinions of three hundred individuals does not suffice to observe the full depth of the debate on the future of the Alliance. Still, our method has brought us closer than ever before.

Future efforts may benefit from several observations regarding the set-up of the project. First, we wanted to include participation from a broad range of international organisations. This spanned those working with NATO in the field such as UN agencies or the Africa Union, or regional organisations that have an interest in the direction in which NATO develops, such as the Arab League, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the Organisation of American States. However, it has been difficult to get their support. Similarly, obtaining support from the European Union, arguably the Alliance's key partner organisation, has been troublesome. Although we succeeded in obtaining some EU participation and interviewed several EU officials, there was also some hesitation among EU officials to participate in a project which was perceived as primarily focusing on the future of NATO. Whether this is due to perceived rivalry between the organisations could not be verified. We maintain, however, and this has been reaffirmed by the views of the respondents, that a solid comprehensive approach and increased cooperation between organisations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations is necessary in order to deal with several key challenges, such as those posed by the global shift of power, resource and energy scarcity, proliferation and state failure. Including the views of these organisations when developing solutions to the key security challenges the transatlantic community faces is not only desirable, but necessary.

Second, according to the respondents, dealing with the key security issues identified by the respondents requires a broader international and comprehensive approach. Yet, this poses a dilemma for the strategic orientation of the Alliance as respondents feel that NATO's orientation to interact with other organisations is not particularly developed. A similar initiative to collect the views among key stakeholder groups on how organisations like the EU or the United Nations should address the key security challenges of the next five to ten years may therefore be useful.

Third, we have been pleasantly surprised by the enthusiasm of national policy planners to participate in this exercise. This opens the possibility that through using such internet-based collaborative technologies key practitioner communities can be involved more frequently and on a wider basis for the development of new ideas. We have attempted to be as inclusive as possible, but naturally improvements may be made on participation.

The *New Horizons* project has shown its worth by capturing the main flavour of the debate among the key communities of the Transatlantic Alliance. It is hoped that future exercises will benefit from the experience gained during this first iteration.

KEEPING THE NUCLEUS TOGETHER

NATO may be compared to a complex atomic nucleus. Just as that nucleus becomes brittle and unstable without the belt of electrons and glue of neutrons that hold it together, NATO may fall victim to the repellent forces within. While this study may lead to more questions rather than answers, *New Horizons* does shed light on the debates inside that nucleus and its immediate surroundings. Central to it are a series of dilemmas that weaken the Alliance's cohesion.

The dilemmas force us to address the Alliance's strategic orientation. This lies at the core of NATO's de-solidarisation. The Alliance must define its mission spectrum with greater clarity, push towards a reconciliation of views on capability development, as well as develop a posture on new emergent concerns. Reinvigorating solidarity requires NATO to reassess how it can defend its common interests, by defining what those interests are, in an age shaped by the rise of a multipolar system, concerns over natural resources and the increasing strategic importance of non-state actors. In order for NATO to move away from de-solidarisation, the Alliance must be flexible enough to deal with the ambitious agenda it confronts and have a robust set of partnerships with

other regional and international organisations. For it is our strong belief that the political-military alliance will only be able to effectively protect its interests by cooperating with other organisations.

In view of the above, on the next page we offer recommendations regarding the strategic dilemmas. These are not elaborate solutions, and often contain elements that require political decisions in capitals, but they may serve as the starting point for addressing the dilemmas. So to speak, these would be part of our answers to the three questions posed by *New Horizons*.


The respondents of *New Horizons* gave us their views and opinions about the future of NATO. Now let us move to act on them.

STRATEGIC DILEMMAS/ MAIN SECURITY ISSUES	POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS	IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
Financial Crisis and Global Shift in Power	Improve operations among different institutions to better reflect the changing division of power.	Develop a pool of flexible, deployable capabilities for sustained global expeditionary combat operations to meet diverse threats.
Resource and Energy Scarcity	Stimulate international solutions to avoid resource competition and nationalism.	NATO should set criteria that at least 40% of member states' armed forces must meet these requirements.
Key Security Trends	Operate in a broader framework with multiple players.	Integrate energy security missions into NATO's mission spectrum.
Proliferation	Negotiate a new, strengthened non-proliferation regime.	Develop a new nuclear deterrent posture for the 21st century.
Afghanistan	Develop a broad and regional approach on the basis of "mutually reinforcing institutions".	Develop a comprehensive approach and operational solidarity. Develop a pool of flexible, deployable capabilities for sustained global expeditionary combat operations
Regions of Concern	n/a	Develop flexible expeditionary capabilities for sustained combat operations to meet collective defence, homeland defence and 'away' missions.
Enlargement	n/a	Develop new rationale on enlargement based on interests
Russia	Accept that Russia is a central node in the international security environment.	Engage Russia politically on issues of common interest, strengthen the NATO-Russia Council while reasserting Alliance solidarity.

ANNEX


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
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THINK TANKS




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STUDENTS




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INDUSTRY




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NATIONAL
MILITARY




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NATIONAL
POLICY
PLANNERS




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NATO



STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITY BY SECURITY ISSUES

NGO



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